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Amartya Sen
Again Emmanuelle
Benicourt (École
des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, France) © Copyright 2004
Emmanuelle Benicourt In issue 15 of
this journal1, I argued that Sen was a neoclassical economist,
and questioned why heterodox economists considered his “capability
approach” as a real force in post-autistic economics. Two responses have
appeared. First, Ingrid
Robeyns2 argued that the view according to which the capability
approach is undeniably neoclassical, just a variation of standard
economics, is “fundamentally mistaken” (i.e., Sen is not neoclassical).
Second, Jorge Buzaglo3 admitted Sen was neoclassical, but
argued that he was a radical-progressive economist (i.e., Sen applies the
conventional apparatus to the advancement of a progressive cause).
Curiously, these responses are contradictory. I will examine each in turn.
Sen’s
normative framework Ingrid
Robeyns pursues her Defence of Amartya Sen by saying :
“the capability
approach gives a consistent normative framework to place these scattered
studies [of development, development ethics, unemployment, famines, gender
inequality, etc] , thus providing a sort of theoretical umbrella for
existing empirical work. Moreover, the capability approach makes it very
clear how different dimensions, such as commodities, observable outcomes
and unobservable opportunities are related.” This is
incorrect. Indeed it runs
contrary to Sen’s central idea. Remember that Sen’s normative approach is
deliberately pluralist. This comes from his critique of and departure from
utilitarianism. Sen refuses to apprehend well-being in a unilateral way
(with the criterion of general happiness or public utility). As he says in
Development as Freedom: To insist that
there should be only one homogeneous magnitude that we value is to reduce
drastically the range of our evaluative reasoning. It is not, for example,
to the credit of classical utilitarianism that it values only pleasure,
without taking any direct interest in freedom, rights, creativity or
actual living conditions. To insist on the mechanical comfort of having
just one homogeneous ‘good thing’ would be to deny our humanity of
reasoning creatures. It is like to make the life of the chef easier by
finding something which –and which alone – we all like (such as
smoked salmon, or perhaps even French fries), or some one quality which we
must all try to maximize (such as the saltiness of the food). (Sen 1999,
p. 77)4. The system he
proposes instead is, to the contrary, based on a “plurality of focus” (Sen
1987, p. 63). As Sen explains in “Capability and Well-Being”:
Because of the
nature of the evaluative space, the capability approach differs from
utilitarian evaluation (...) in making room for a variety of human acts
and states as important in themselves (not just because they may
produce utility, nor just to the extent that they yield utility).
(Sen 1993, p. 33). At first, all
this seems obvious: who can deny the importance of “self respect”, of
“fulfilling one’s creativity”, of “avoiding morbidity”, etc.? No one I suspect, not even the
utilitarians. So then why did they stick to a single criterion? This is a
very old question, as old as ethics, but one which Sen seems to ignore. He
contents himself with criticizing the “arbitrary” and “defective” nature
(Sen 1987, p. 62) of monist approaches, as if he did not know of this
long-standing problem so central to philosophical
ethics. The
problem of the multiplicity of ethical criteria
If the
multiplicity of ethical criteria has been refused by all great
philosophers, utilitarian or not, it is for a very simple reason: it does
not permit one to settle all situations with which a philosopher , or a
man of action, may be confronted.
John Stuart Mill summarized the problem as
follows: There exists
no moral system under which there do not arise equivocal cases of
conflicting obligation. These are the real difficulties, the knotty points
both in the theory of ethics, and in the conscientious guidance of
personal conduct. (…)
If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be
invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible. Though
the application of the standard may be difficult, it is better than none
at all: while in other systems, the moral laws claiming independent
authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them;
their claims to precedence one over the other rest on little better than
sophistry, and unless determined, as they generally are, by the
acknowledged influence of considerations of utility, afford a free scope
for the actions of personal desires and partialities. We must remember
that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it
requisite that first principles should be appealed to” (emphasis added)
(Mill 1861, pp.
157-158). Adam Smith
(admired by Sen) also used a monist criteria : “ All
constitutions of government (…) are valued only in proportion as they tend
to promote the happiness of those who live under them. This is their sole
use and end. ” (Smith 1790, p. 185). Emmanuel Kant, a
non-utilitarian philosopher with whom Sen claims affinity, was also very
clear on this subject: Considered
objectively, there can be only one human reason. (…) So the
moralist rightly says that there is only one virtue and one
doctrine of virtue, that is, a single system that connects all duties of
virtue by one principle.” (Kant 1796, p. 81). Relying on an
ultimate criterion enables one to make, in all cases, a choice between two
actions, rules, or institutions that are in conflict with one another. In
the capability approach, how is one to choose between constructing a
school and building a dam? No one knows. Séverine Deneulin seems to feel
there is a problem when she explains and asks: “Sen gives a reason for not
specifying what is to be counted as relevant capabilities: his concern for
pluralism. (…). [But, ] if one refuses to take any position regarding the
ends that are to be promoted, how then can we know which opportunities
have to be given to people in order to improve their quality of life? How
can we give people conditions for a better human life, without knowing
what a better life consists of?” (Deneulin 2002, pp. 500-501). Thus, Sen’s
pluralist perspective is precisely what makes the approach non-operational
for policy makers.
This leads us to
Jorge Buzaglo’s arguments. He rejects the partition of economics between
the categories “orthodox/heterodox”, and asserts that although Amartya Sen
is an orthodox economist, he applies the “conventional apparatus to the
advancement of a progressive cause”. Beyond the
homo economicus? Jorge
Buzaglo believes that the
real force of the capability approach is that it enables us to go beyond
the “homo economicus model of conventional microeconomics [which]
does not specify how the preferences of the mind have been themselves
determined, and even less how the mind determines the body to perform its
“optimal” decisions in the market”. He proposes, following the “Spinozian
roots” of the capability approach, to introduce “the notion of an
(intersubjective) economic mental space”, which would make parts of
standard theory lose their “enchanting power”: “A case in point is the
Arrow-Debreu model of general equilibrium, the central piece of
conventional economic theory, and the archetype of interaction between
atomistic, self-caused minds, and passive bodies (consumers, factor
owners, firms, etc.) acting in the markets”. A few things
need to be noted here. First,
Amartya Sen has never rejected the Arrow-Debreu model: he simply proposes
to adjust it in order to extend it “to the perspective of substantial
freedoms” (Sen 1999, p. 119). Second, Sen has never criticized the notion
of society that this model represents. Regardless of how consumers are
represented, the Arrow Debreu model of general equilibrium is not a
representation of “decentralized” or “market economies”, as Sen (Sen 1999,
p. 117) and Buzaglo imply. The society represented is a centralized system
with price-taker agents and an auctioneer that establishes, through
“tâtonnement”, the prices on the basis of the total quantities supplied
and demanded. Agents can neither propose prices nor exchange directly.
Changing the
representation of the consumer in microeconomic theory (from the homo
economicus to some other representation) does not change the nature of
the society which is represented. It does not remove the “enchanting
power” of “markets”, which,
in the idealized theoretical
case, are centralised systems. Because the
society described by the Arrow-Debreu model refers to some kind of planned
economy, real-life reforms based on this model would entail “more imposed
rules”, “given prices”, etc.
Yet this is far from being Sen’s position. In fact if one looks at
Sen’s works concerning the intervention of the state in the economy, no
clear position can be found. Indeed, his stance is highly ambiguous and
sometimes contradicts the theoretical framework he retains, that is, the
Arrow-Debreu model. For example, in
“Radical Needs and Moderate Reforms”, Sen claims, concerning the economic
reforms aiming at India’s “liberalisation” and “deregulation”, that:
The departures
are too moderate – and too tolerant of parts of established
tradition of economic planning in India. More – rather than less --
radicalism is needed at this time. (Sen 1997, p. 4) He also says:
The counter
productive nature of some of the governmental restrictions, controls and
regulations has been clear for a long time. They have not only interfered
with the efficiency of economic operations (especially for modern
industries), but also have often failed lamentably to promote any kind of
real equity in distributional matters. (ibid, p. 9) Yet, Sen admits
in another book written with Jean Drèze: The government
may have a major role in initiating and facilitating market-reliant
economic growth (…) This role is easy to understand in the light of
economic theory – particularly related to difficulties of initiation,
connected with such difficulties of ‘tâtonnement’ (pre-exchange
negotiations about market prices, leading to simultaneous production
decisions), economies of large scale, importance of technological
externalities, and the integral nature of skill formation. The nurturing
of an early market mechanism by an active state does not, of course,
preclude a more self-sufficient role of the market later on.” (Drèze &
Sen 1995, p. 19)5. Drèze and Sen would still have to
explain how, theoretically, this “market” could “later on” be “more
self-sufficient”… One can indeed
ask: Are the European and the US
markets “self sufficient”? To answer these sorts of questions, one
has to think about what markets really are, to reflect on their actual
“mechanisms”, etc.. And, as far as I know, studying Sen doesn’t help much
in tackling these difficult questions. Conclusion
Although Amartya
Sen possesses admirable personal qualities (tolerance, enthusiasm and, as
I myself experienced during an OFCE conference in Paris, a great sense of
humour), I really do not see how the theory he proposes can be used for
analysing real-world issues, nor how his positions in matters of economic
policy can be considered “radical” or “progressive”: Sen doesn’t propose anything,
except generalities about “freedom”, education, and health. Furthermore,
he never treats issues relating to the means to implement these general
positions: How are the schools to be financed? What fiscal system leads to
the “equality of capabilities”? Furthermore,
wouldn’t it be most peculiar if international organisations such as the
World Bank took as a reference point a “progressive” and “radical”
economist? Sure, some
neoclassical economists take “radical” and “progressive” positions. For
example, Joseph Stiglitz harshly criticized IMF policy and supported
Argentina’s non payment. But this is far from being Sen’s case, since he
has never offered clear and open positions on concrete matters.
Notes
1.
Emmanuelle Benicourt, “Is Amartya Sen a Post-Autistic Economist?”,
post-autistic
economics review,
issue no. 15, September 4, 2002, article 4. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue15.htm. 2.
Ingrid
Robeyns, “In Defence of
Amartya Sen, post-autistic
economics review, issue no. 17, December 4, 2002,
article 5. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue17.htm. 3.
Jorge Buzaglo, “Capabilities: From Spinoza to Sen and Beyond.: Parts I and
II”, post-autistic economics review, issues no. 20 and
21, June and September 2003,
http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue20.htm
and http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue21.htm. 4.He
had already critiqued monist approaches in On Ethics and Economics:
“In the utilitarian approach all the diverse goods are reduced into a
homogeneous descriptive magnitude (as utility is supposed to be). (…) Not
only is there a unified complete view of ethical goodness (weighting the
different objects of value vis-à-vis each other), but even the objects of
value must be all of the same type (singular and homogeneous) in
this ‘monist’ conception.” (Sen 1987, pp. 62-63). 5.They
also assert: “the formal theory of achievements of the market mechanism
is, implicitly, much dependent on governmental action” (Drèze &
Sen 1995, p. 19). Bibliography
Deneulin, Séverine (2002), “Perfectionism, paternalism and
liberalism in Sen and Nussbaum’s Capability approach”, Review of Political
Economy, Vol.14, N°4, October 2002, pp. 497-518. Drexe,
Jean & Sen, Amartya K. (1995), India: Economic Development and
Social Opportunity, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Kant,
Emmanuel (1796), Métaphysique des
mœurs : doctrine du droit, Paris, Librairie Philosophique J.
Vrin, 1988. Mill,
John Stuart (1861), Utilitarianism, in Utilitarianism, On Liberty and
Other Essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp.
129-201. Sen,
Amartya K. (1987), On Ethics and
Economics, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. Sen,
Amartya K. (1993), “Capability and Well-Being”, Nussbaum & Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, pp. 30-53. Sen,
Amartya K. (1997) “Radical Needs and Moderate Reforms”, Drèze & Sen
(eds.), Indian Development:
Selected Regional Perspectives, Oxford, Oxford University
Press. Sen,
Amartya K. (1999), Development as
Freedom, New York, Anchor Books, 2000. Smith,
Adam (1790), The Theory of Moral
Sentiments, The Glasgow Edition, Ed. D. D. Raphael & A. L. Macfie,
Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1976. ______________________________ |