A political unit that has overwhelming superiority in military power, and uses that power to influence the internal behavior of other states, is called an empire. The United States [is] an indirect empire, to be sure, but an empire nonetheless.... If this is correct, our goal is not combating a rival, but maintaining our imperial position, and maintaining imperial order. Imperial wars are not so constrained [from escalation as when still confronted by the Soviet Union]. The maximum amount of force can and should e used as quickly as possible for psychological impact - to demonstrate that the empire cannot be challenged with impunity. Now we are in the business of bringing down hostile governments and creating governments favorable to us. Imperial wars end, but imperial garrisons must be left in place for decades to ensure order and stability. This is, in fact, what we are beginning to see, first in the Balkans and now in Central Asia [and] requires a lighly armed ground force for garrison purposes. Finally, imperial strategy focuses on preventing the emergence of powerful, hostile challengers to empire: by war if necessary, but by imperial assimilation if possible. China will be a major economic and military power in a generationbut is not yet powerful enough to be a challenger to American empire, and the goal of the United States is to prevent that challenge from emerging. The United States could do what it does now: reassure its friends in Asia that we will not allow Chinese military intimidation to succeed.We may also want unconventional weapons with which to remind China.
Stephen Peter Rose
Harvard University
Kaneb professor of national security and military affairs,
Director of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies,
HARVARD MAGAZINE May-June 2002, pp 30-31
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