By Peter Kornbluh
| Editor's Note: On Oct. 16, British police arrested
Chile’s former dictator Augusto Pinochet at a London hospital where he was recovering
from a herniated disc operation. The British acted on an extradition request
from Spain where a judge has charged Pinochet with committing atrocities against Spanish
citizens in Chile during and after Pinochet’s bloody coup in 1973.
But Pinochet’s 1973 coup did not occur in a vacuum. There was a U.S. hand
behind the scenes, pulling many strings.
Since 1970, the Nixon administration had worked to de-stabilize the elected
government of Socialist Salvador Allende. The CIA had laid the ground work for the coup
d’etat.
In view of Pinochet’s recent arrest, the following article looks back a
quarter century at the U.S. role in the political violence that shook Chile. |
Twenty-five years ago, tanks rumbled through the streets of
Chile, terrified civilians were lined up before firing squads at the National Stadium, the
elected president was dead.
Yet, at Richard Nixon's White House, the events were a cause for celebration, a
culmination of three years of covert operations, propaganda and economic sabotage.
Newly declassified U.S. government records put Washington’s role in the
Chilean coup in sharper focus than ever before. The papers also shed light on corners of
the story that previously had been suspected, but not proven.
The documents describe how an angry Nixon demanded a coup, if necessary, to block
the inauguration of Marxist Salvador Allende following his victory in the 1970 Chilean
elections.
The documents reveal that an early coup plan -- known as "Track II" --
continued through the assassination of pro-constitutional Chilean Gen. Rene Schneider, who
was gunned down by military plotters on Oct. 22, 1970.
The fuller documentary record contradicts the long-standing claim by former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger that "Track II" was shut down a week before Schneider's
murder.
After Allende’s inauguration, Nixon did not give up. The documents detail
what his administration did to make the Chilean economy "scream," how the CIA
spread "black" propaganda, and how Washington finally goaded the Chilean army
into the coup of 1973.
The Chilean coup leader, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, held power for the next 17 years,
relinquishing control in 1990 only after arranging immunity for himself and his top
generals.
Until Oct. 16, Pinochet had escaped all punishment for his actions which left
thousands dead and Chile a bitterly divided nation.
Yet, at the start of the Chilean tragedy almost three decades ago, the U.S. government
wasn't even sure that Chile was important to American national interests.
Except for some multi-national corporations which had mining and other business
interests, the sliver of a country embedded between the towering Andes and the Pacific
Ocean was barely known to most Americans. But the CIA began alerting Washington to the
rise of Allende's leftist Popular Unity coalition in 1968. By 1970, the CIA warned that
Allende was poised to win the largest bloc of votes in Chile's national election.
At the time, the Vietnam War was President Nixon’s biggest headache. Chile
was more a nuisance, although Nixon feared Allende’s victory might erode the image of
U.S. strength.
On March 25, June 27 and Aug. 7, 1970, then-national security advisor Kissinger
chaired meetings of the "40 Committee," a high-level inter-agency group. The
committee ordered covert operations to "denigrate Allende and his Popular Unity
coalition," according to one historical CIA summary.
But the State Department questioned the alarmist fears. State reported to the
White House on Aug. 18, 1970, that "we identify no vital U.S. national interests
within Chile."
In a 23-page report, State added that Allende's election did not even present a
unique set of problems. "In examining the potential threat posed by Allende, it is
important to bear in mind that some of the problems foreseen for the United States in the
event of his election are likely to arise no matter who becomes Chile's next
president."
Nevertheless, the U.S. ambassador to Chile and other senior Nixon officials saw a
regional crisis -- and a blow to Washington's international prestige -- if an avowed
Marxist won a fair presidential election in South America.
Ambassador Edward Korry began sending frantic, minute-by-minute commentaries about the
last days of Chile’s 1970 campaign. Korry's cables became known inside the State
Department as "Korrygrams" because of their unusual language and undiplomatic
opinions.
On election day, Korry sent no fewer than 18 updates. He reported that he could
hear "the mounting roar of Allendistas acclaiming their victory" from the
streets. Korry wrote: "We have suffered a grievous defeat."
The next three weeks, Korry flooded Washington with lurid reports alleging a
communist takeover. In one cable, he announced that "there is a graveyard smell to
Chile, the fumes of a democracy in decomposition. They stank in my nostrils in
Czechoslovakia in 1948 and they are no less sickening here today."
Allende’s victory also sent Nixon into a rage and started the president’s men
plotting how to stop Allende’s inauguration. Cables focused on a scheme to derail
formal ratification of Allende's victory by Chile's congress on Oct. 24, 1970.
According to one idea, the congress would defy the electorate and pick the
runner-up, Jorge Alessandri, "who would renounce the presidency and thus provoke new
elections in which [outgoing president Eduardo] Frei would run."
On Sept. 12, Korry and Assistant Secretary of State John Richardson met secretly
with Frei at the presidential palace. While much of the conversation remains classified,
Korry reported that Frei saw only a "one in 20 chance" to stop Allende, but
added that he could not "afford to be anything but the president of all Chileans at
this time."
Despite the odds, Nixon ordered the CIA to try. The covert action to reverse the
results of the Chilean election -- by political or military means -- took the code name,
"Project FUBELT."
On Sept. 16, CIA director Richard Helms informed his senior covert action staff
that "President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was not acceptable
to the United States," according to one declassified CIA memo.
"The President asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to
unseat him," Helms added. The CIA had 48 hours to present an action plan to
Kissinger.
Soon, the CIA was pressuring Frei. "CIA mobilized an interlocking political
action and propaganda campaign designed both to goad and entice Frei" into the
"so-called Frei re-election gambit," according to a declassified "Report on
CIA Chilean Task Force Activities."
The scheme had "only one purpose," Helms told the NSC: "to induce President
Frei to prevent Allende's [formal] election by the congress on 24 October, and, failing
that, to support -- by benevolent neutrality at the least and conspiratorial benediction
at the most - - a military coup which would prevent Allende from taking office."
The election gambit was known as Track I. The back-up plan for a military coup was called
Track II.
The CIA inducements to Frei included offering substantial sums of money to his
"re-election" campaign, bribing other Christian Democrats outright, and
orchestrating visits and calls from respected leaders abroad.
To influence Frei through his wife, the CIA instigated the wiring of telegrams to Mrs.
Frei from women's groups in other Latin American nations.
Other mailings to Frei included CIA-planted news articles from around the world about
Chile's peril. The articles were part of a covert "black" propaganda campaign
which, the CIA boasted, resulted in at least 726 stories, broadcasts and editorials
against an Allende presidency.
Despite these labors, the Frei "re-election gambit" failed, as Frei refused to
have the Christian Democrats block Allende's ratification.
"Frei did manage to confide to several top-ranking military officers that he would
not oppose a coup, with a guarded implication he might even welcome one," Helms
reported to Kissinger.
But "Frei moved quickly away from" the incipient putsch when right-wing coup
plotters assassinated Gen. Schneider on Oct. 22, 1970, one CIA cable said. Schneider had
insisted that the military accept the will of the people and respect the Chilean
constitution.
U.S. complicity in Schneider's murder has long been a touchy point for senior Nixon
administration officials.
Kissinger went to great lengths to distance himself from the assassination, both in
testimony to Congress and in his memoirs. Kissinger claimed that CIA coup plotting was
"turned off" at a meeting on Oct. 15 -- a week before Schneider was murdered.
CIA deputy director of plans Thomas “Karamessines carried from his Oct. 15 meeting
with me an instruction to turn off General [Roberto] Viaux’s coup plot and a general
mandate to ‘preserve our assets’ in Chile in the (clearly remote) chance that
some other opportunity might develop,” Kissinger wrote in the White House Years.
But a declassified "top secret" memorandum of that Oct. 15 meeting undercuts
Kissinger's account. At the meeting with Karamessines and Gen. Alexander Haig, Kissinger
was quoted as demanding "that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on
every Allende weak spot in sight -- now ... and into the future until such time as new
marching orders are given."
Kissinger also demanded tight secrecy around the coup plotting. "Dr. Kissinger
discussed his desire that the word of our encouragement to the Chilean military in recent
weeks be kept as secret as possible," the memo said.
"Mr. Karamessines stated emphatically that we had been doing everything possible in
this connection, including the use of false flag officers, car meetings, and every
conceivable precaution."
The next day, a secret "eyes only" cable from CIA headquarters to Henry
Hecksher, CIA station chief in Santiago, revealed that Kissinger's marching orders were
relayed to the field.
"It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup ... prior to
October 24," the cable read. "But efforts in this regard will continue
vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this
end utilizing every appropriate resource. ... It is imperative that these actions be
implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG [U.S. government] and American hand
be well hidden," the cable continued.
"Please review all your present and possibly new activities to include propaganda,
black operations, surfacing of intelligence or disinformation, personal contacts, or
anything else your imagination can conjure which will permit you to continue to press
forward toward our [deleted] objective."
While undercutting Kissinger, the records back the 1975 testimony of the CIA’s
Karamessines. He told a congressional investigation that "Track II was never really
ended. ... What we were told to do was to continue our efforts. Stay alert, and do what we
could to contribute to the eventual achievement of the objectives and purposes of Track
II."
After Allende's inauguration on Nov. 3, the CIA continued working toward a military coup.
The geo-political rationale was outlined in a CIA postmortem dated Nov. 12, 1970. It noted
that "Dr. Salvador Allende became the first democratically-elected Marxist head of
state in the history of Latin America -- despite the opposition of the U.S. Government.
“As a result, U.S. prestige and interests ... are being affected materially at a time
when the U.S. can ill afford problems in an area that has been traditionally accepted as
the U.S. 'backyard'."
The highlights of "Project FUBELT" were cited in both the newly released CIA
documents and in papers uncovered by the 1975 congressional inquiry.
Covert funds were funnelled into Chilean congressional campaigns; CIA agents stayed close
to disgruntled Chilean military officers; to keep the military on edge, the CIA planted
false propaganda suggesting that the Chilean left planned to take control of the armed
forces; and the CIA secretly poured $1.5 million into one of Chile's leading newspapers,
El Mercurio.
But the CIA covert operation was only one leg of what U.S. officials called "a
triad" of actions toward Chile, according to National Security Decision Memorandum
93. A second leg was "correct but cool" diplomatic pressure and a third leg was
the "invisible blockade" of loans and credits to Chile.
For years, historians have debated if such a blockade existed, or whether Allende's
socialist economic policies led to the loss of economic credit. But the new NSC records
show conclusively that the Nixon administration moved quickly and quietly to shut down
multilateral and bilateral foreign aid to Chile.
At the Inter-American Development Bank, the NSC simply informed the U.S. representative
that he did not have authority to vote for loans to Chile.
A secret report -- prepared for Kissinger several weeks after Allende's inauguration --
said, "the U.S. Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank understands
that he will remain uninstructed until further notice on pending loans to Chile. As ... an
affirmative vote by the U.S. is required for loan approval, this will effectively bar
approval of the loans."
At the World Bank, U.S. officials worked behind the scenes to ensure that Chile would be
disqualified for a pending $21 million livestock improvement credit as well as future
loans.
In addition, the president of the Export-Import Bank agreed to "cooperate fully"
with Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyer on the
discontinuation of new credits and guarantees to Chile.
The Nixon administration also moved to isolate Allende's government diplomatically around
the world.
Secret strategy papers were drawn up by an inter-agency working group in early December
1970. The papers reported on "USG consultation with selected Latin American
governments ... to promote their sharing of our concern over Chile."
The mix of economic sabotage, political propaganda and army prodding worked.
Allende found himself confronted by growing disorder and soaring inflation. At every turn,
his policies encountered well-funded adversaries.
On Sept. 11, 1973, amid the mounting chaos, Chile's military struck. In a classic coup
d'etat, the army seized control of strategic sites throughout the country and cornered
Allende in his presidential offices. He died in a fire-fight, apparently shooting himself
in the head to avoid capture.
Nixon officials were ecstatic over the coup. "Chile's coup de etat was close to
perfect," stated a "SitRep"-- situation report -- from the U.S. military
group in Valparaiso. The report, written by Marine Lt. Col. Patrick Ryan, characterized
Sept. 11, 1973, as Chile's "day of destiny" and "Our D-Day."
CIA records detailing clandestine operations after the coup remain highly classified. But
the "40 Committee," chaired by Kissinger, immediately authorized the CIA to
"assist the junta in gaining a more positive image, both at home and abroad,"
according to documents previously revealed by the Senate Intelligence Committee.
As part of those efforts, the CIA helped the junta write a "white book"
justifying the coup. The CIA financed advisors who helped the military prepare a new
economic plan for the country. The CIA paid for military spokesmen to travel around the
world to promote the new regime. And, the CIA used its own media assets to cast the junta
in a positive light.
The reality in Chile was far different, as the U.S. government knew.
Only 19 days after the coup, a secret briefing paper prepared for Kissinger -- entitled
"Chilean Executions" -- put the "total dead" from the coup at 1,500.
The paper reported that the junta had summarily executed 320 individuals -- three times
more than publicly acknowledged.
Despite the carnage, U.S. officials described the scene with soaring rhetoric. "Now
that they are in fact again a 'country in liberty' no obstacle is too high, no problem too
difficult to solve," stated the Navy section of the U.S. military group in a
situation report on Oct. 1, 1973.
"Their progress may be slow, but it will be as free men aspiring to goals which are
for the benefit of Chile."
To help, Nixon opened the spigot of economic aid. Three weeks after the coup, the Nixon
administration authorized $24 million in commodity credits to buy wheat -- credits that
had been denied to Allende's government. The United States provided a second $24 million
in commodity credits to Chile for feed corn, and planned to transfer two destroyers to the
Chilean navy.
The aid flowed, although Assistant Secretary of State Jack Kubisch reported to Kissinger
that junta leader Pinochet had ruled out "any time table for turning Chile back to
the civilians." Chile's record as South America’s pre-eminent democracy was
coming to an end.
But even the CIA's best propaganda could not hide the reality on the ground. The coup's
brutality was drawing worldwide condemnation and prompting worries at the White House.
"Internationally, the Junta's repressive image continues to plague it," stated a
Kissinger briefing paper on Nov. 16, 1973. Reports of mass arrests -- by then, U.S.
intelligence put the number at 13,500 -- as well as summary executions, torture and
"disappearances" were reaching the world press.
The administration fretted about an image problem in the United States, too, because two
Americans -- Charles Horman and Frank Terruggi -- were among those executed at the
National Stadium. Their deaths constituted a "difficult public relations
situation," one cable reported on Oct. 21, 1973.
The Kubisch report to Kissinger cited "heavy" media criticism and congressional
inquiries on the two executions. In February 1974, Kubisch delicately raised the American
deaths with Chilean Foreign Minister Manuel Huerta, according to a newly declassified
memorandum of the conversation.
The topic was broached "in the context of the need to be careful to keep relatively
small issues in our relationship from making our cooperation more difficult," the
memo said.
But the first wave of executions was only the start of atrocities in Pinochet's Chile.
Human rights violations kept complicating U.S.-Chilean relations, especially after Nixon's
Watergate resignation in August 1974.
By 1975, human rights advocates were challenging the Ford administration's continued
support for Pinochet.
A confidential NSC memorandum dated July 1, 1975, revealed a mutiny even inside the U.S.
Embassy. "A number of officers in the Embassy at Santiago have written a
dissent," according to the memo prepared for national security advisor Brent
Scowcroft.
The dissent was "strongly supported by the Policy Planning office in ARA [State's
Latin American division], calling for cutting off all economic and military assistance to
Chile until the human rights situation improved."
The memo said the embassy staff was overruled by then-Ambassador David Popper who wanted
to continue support for the junta while making stronger protests on human rights. Popper
met with the Chilean minister of economic coordination, Raul Saez, on April 6, 1975, to
discuss the concerns.
Popper said "the most difficult problem we had in our embassy had to do with
allegations of torture," according to an embassy cable. "The root of the problem
seemed to me to be the absolute power of DINA [Chile's intelligence service] to do
whatever it desired in detaining and handling suspects."
Saez replied that "he had remonstrated with Pinochet about DINA, so far without much
success." The minister then blamed "fascist advisors to the junta" for the
atrocities.
But the declassified documents portrayed DINA as anything but a rogue agency. Rather, it
was an intelligence service which served at Pinochet's personal command.
On April 15, 1975, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency reported that since the decree
"establishing DINA as the national intelligence arm of the government, Colonel
[Manuel] Contreras has reported exclusively to, and received orders only from, President
Pinochet."
By summer 1975, human rights abuses forced the Ford administration to edge back from the
Chilean junta.
Pinochet requested a visit with President Ford in August, but White House officials feared
the meeting "would stimulate criticism domestically in the United States and from
Latin America." The NSC instructed Popper to "discourage it by saying that the
President's schedule was already full."
In 1976, U.S.-Chilean relations received another jolt when DINA agents traveled to
Washington and exploded a bomb under a car carrying former Chilean diplomat Orlando
Letelier and two Americans. Letelier and one of the Americans, Ronni Moffitt, died.
A federal investigation traced the bombing back to DINA and some Cuban-American
accomplices. A Senate investigation linked the Letelier bombing to a program of
cross-border assassinations known as Operation Condor.
That operation had attacked Pinochet critics in Spain, Italy and Argentina as well as the
United States.
But Pinochet and his coup makers would avoid prosecution at least in Chile. Before
gradually returning the reins of government to civilians in 1990, Pinochet engineered an
amnesty for himself and his senior officers.
Only DINA chief Contreras was sentenced to seven years in prison, for his role in the
Letelier bombing. In his defense, Contreras insisted that he was just following Pinochet's
orders.
While the newly released documents answer some mysteries about the covert U.S. policy
toward Chile, other questions await additional declassifications.
Still-secret records could clarify Pinochet's responsibility for Operation Condor as well
as the CIA's knowledge about the state-sponsored terrorism and the CIA relationship with
the DINA.
Many of the secrets are -- or soon will be -- more than 25 years old. At that age, they
fall under President Clinton's 1995 Executive Order mandating full declassification of
national security secrets with few exceptions.
The secrets also could clarify who’s to blame for deaths of foreign nationals, the
case now under way in Spain.
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