In this section I examine more concretely the interplay of authoritarian and democratic rule. Of the six models outlined only B, C, D and perhaps E approximate to concrete African experiences. This excludes the South African case, whose forms of accumulation are similar to those of model A, but whose apartheid system has prevented the development of a national democratic system. In discussing the stages in the struggles for democracy, I focus mainly on C and D. Only a few countries have practiced model B, the clientelist type of democracy. I am, at this stage, mainly concerned with general historical patterns. No attempt is made to focus on any particular country. Needless to add that such broad historical surveys tend to simplify and, in some cases, gloss over unique characteristics.

The struggle for democracy in Africa has a complex and tortuous history. Democratization triumphed at certain historical conjunctures, but it was blocked and suppressed in other phases. I identify three stages in the contemporary struggles for democracy: the decolonization period of guided democratization; the post-colonial period of state capitalist expansion and authoritarian rule; and the period of economic crisis which is currently generating pressures for re-democratization. The character of the democratic project differs in each period, being structurally related to the underlying forms of accumulation, the level of development of the corresponding civil societies, and the nature of the social contracts and public welfare.  

Decolonization in much of Africa occurred within the context of guided democratization. After much prevarication, the colonial authorities were forced to embrace democracy as a strategy for maintaining core residual interests. It was envisaged that plural forms of politics would sharpen local differences and dilute the militancy of the anti-colonial opposition. Furthermore, the values of individual self-interest were expected to permeate the social milieu of the leading nationalists. The emerging élites, on the other hand, saw democracy as a strategy to end their subordinate positions in the colonial economy. Educated professionals wanted greater access to state resources and an improved standard of living that would reflect their training and perceived social status. Those in the commercial sector were anxious to break the monopolistic power of the colonial banks and trading companies.

Subordinate groups also pushed through their own demands. Workers wanted to have independent unions to negotiate freely with employers realistic wages and benefits that would reflect the post-war cost of living. Peasants and artisans were concerned about improved prices for their products; and students wanted to expand the frontiers of African education and political power. Democratization provided an institutional framework for reconciling the conflicting interests thrown up by the authoritarian colonial economy. It checked the absolutism of colonial rule by opening up space for popular participation in government and the rise of independent organizations.

But the authoritarian character of the colonial economy prevented the growth of liberal democracy. The colonial state forcibly restructured pre-existing economies and subsequently regulated peasant production through monopolistic trading companies and marketing boards. The trading monopolies and the state failed to transform the petty commodity sector and rural society in general. There was also hardly any major form of urban industrialization. Underdevelopment and dependency theory has adequately described the enclave dynamics and rural-urban socio-economic disarticulation that informed this type of development. What is more, public welfare occupied very low priority in the governance of those societies as very conservative fiscal and monetary policies were pursued. Public welfare did not become a major issue in state policy until the structures of decolonization were put in place in the 1940s.² Colonial rule was maintained through the use of force and the clientelist structures of indirect rule.

Democratization and decolonization took place against the background of a poorly developed civil society. Intense struggles had to be waged over the question of making the modern élites and their political parties the vanguard and pathways to self-government, rather than the traditional structures of authority which were dominated by the state (Nordman, 1979).

The original colonial agenda was subsequently defeated. The struggle for democracy and self-rule was conducted mainly through the medium of urban-based political parties, communal associations and workers unions. Although a class structure was already discernible, those who participated in the nationalist struggles did so mainly as individuals rather than as representatives of corporate organizations. This was the case whether the actors were journalists, academics, doctors, students, farmers, artisans or market women. Their respective organizations, where they existed, were poorly developed to advance any viable corporate strategy. Individuals tended to act almost unilaterally on behalf of their social groups. The underdevelopment of civil organizations allowed the educated élites to determine the direction of decolonization. The élites were the only group with the capacity to pull the disparate social forces together and articulate national development strategies.

But democratization also strengthened the alliance between the emerging élites and the colonial authorities. This facilitated the growth of a nascent local bourgeoisie. It gave the anti-colonial alliance a decidedly class character and blunted the popular orientation of the democratic project. Rather than democratize the colonial economy, the nationalist élites ruled through the state monopolies and the colonial patronage networks to consolidate and expand their economic and political power. In Nigeria, for instance, the regionalization of the marketing boards in the run up to independence led to the transfer of accumulated peasant surpluses into the hands of competing politicians and business groups. Public probes showed how these resources were plundered by the emerging dominant power élite (Osoba, 1978). Decolonization did not fully establish democratic rule, even though the period stands out as a major landmark in democratic experiments in Africa. Representative governments were introduced in controlled stages (Collier, 1982); the right to free expression and association was coloured with proscriptions, the banning of radical literature and the arrest of activists considered to be too militant for the transition process.  

The first decade and a half of independence was remarkable for the emergence of a model of accumulation that questioned the limited advances in democratization. Elaborate strategies were formulated by the new rulers, donor agencies and the World Bank to accelerate the pace of development. The basic model was influenced by the dominant Keynesian-oriented paradigm in development economics, which stressed the need for state intervention to correct market failures and stimulate the process of industrialization (Taylor and Shapiro, 1990). The state would use the proceeds of peasant surplus and rents from extractive industries to finance régimes of import-substitution industrialization. Where such surpluses were not enough, donor agencies and private foreign capital would provide the extra finance. The state was to offer a package of incentives to foreign enterprises, subsidize the growth of local capital and transform the petty commodity sector. Social expenditure projects were to be launched to provide basic infrastructure for development, and to sustain the loyalty of the subordinate groups of the anti-colonial alliance. The fledgling business groups would ultimately appropriate a large chunk of the resources of such projects for their own development.

The model registered some interesting rates of growth in a number of African countries, particularly Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria, prompting many Marxists and liberal development economists to question the static assumptions and predictions of underdevelopment theory. As Mkandawire notes, "...Between 1960 and 1975...Africa's industry (which) grew at the annual rate of 7.5 per cent...compared favourably with the 7.8 per cent for Latin America (and the) 7.5 per cent for South-East Asia" (Mkandawire, 1988a: 31). The GDP growth rates for the period 1965-1973 was 6.1 per cent (World Bank, 1989). In most countries, the state became the major source of investment and national employment. State expenditure in schools, health, public services and food supplies grew exponentially. In 1972, just a year before the first world oil price shocks, central government expenditure for 21 sub-Saharan African countries for which data are available was 21.1 per cent of the gross national products³ (World Bank, 1989). Although there were attempts in a number of countries to promote integrated rural development, the overall development strategy worsened the rural-urban terms of trade and led to flights of rural populations into urban centres. Economic growth intensified class differentiation and encouraged the growth of institutional forms of social organization with mandates from members to bargain for the expanding public resources. The era of rent-seeking forms of state capitalism had arrived.

What was the social and political basis of this model of accumulation? In his seminal work of 1973, O'Donnell challenged one of the central hypotheses of liberal democratic theory that associates rapid economic development with political democracy. In the Latin American context of the 1960s and 1970s, high rates of growth and modernization produced, instead, what O'Donnell called "bureaucratic-authoritarianism" (O'Donnell, 1973). Indeed, Brazil's military rulers relied on their country's record of high growth rates to legitimize their authoritarian rule for much of that period (Martins, 1986).

Taking into account Africa's lower levels of industrialization and bureaucratic development, it seems to me that O'Donnell's proposition captures some aspects of the African experience of the same period. Democracy was seen by the new African rulers and emerging local entrepreneurs as obstructive of both corporate and private accumulation. It encouraged demands for redistribution as opposed to production, and forced rulers and entrepreneurs to be accountable to the wider populace for the way they handled public resources; it was also felt that democracy would facilitate ethnic polarization at the expense of national unity. Military and one-party dictatorships were defended as necessary political arrangements for nation building and economic development. In the context of Africa's changing societies, democracy was seen as a source of political instability (Huntington, 1968; Mamdani, Mkandawire and Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1988; Anyang' Nyong'o, 1988b).

Several ideologies, ranging from African socialism and humanism to negritude and authenticity, were propagated by the new rulers to control dissent and project African societies as homogeneous. The democratic impulse of the decolonization period had taught the emergent social groups the power of collective action in the politics of resource allocation. The logical growth of civil society that the expansion of unions, professional associations and interest group organizations created was seen by the dominant groups and state authorities as a threat to economic development and private accumulation.

Various strategies were employed to regulate the activities of the social groups. One-party régimes with "socialist orientations" simply co-opted some of the popular organizations into the party structures and floated alternative organizations at various levels of society to check the development of new autonomous organizations. Such practices were common in Benin, the Congo, Ghana under Nkrumah, Guinea under Sekou Toure, and Tanzania. Other less ideological one-party states imposed restrictions on the activities of unions and associations, co-opted the leadership of popular organizations into policy-making institutions, and strengthened patron-client relations with traditional authority. Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal (before the democratic reforms) and Sierra Leone fall under this category. Military régimes such as those of Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Togo and Zaire tended to follow the practices of the latter, although some, like Nigeria, were relatively less successful in controlling dissent and co-opting popular organizations. The relative openness of political life that flourished under decolonization was severely curtailed in most countries.

Authoritarianism did not however destroy the social contract that underpinned the nationalist struggles. Indeed, the legitimacy of authoritarian rule rested on the ability and willingness of the political authorities to promote public welfare. Such an ability depended on the sustainability of economic growth. The social contract that provided such legitimacy was unabashedly top-down. Popular struggles against these repressive arrangements were initiated and sustained in a number of countries (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1988a), but the balance was unmistakably in favour of generalized authoritarian rule.  

The authoritarian model based its legitimacy on continued accumulation, positive rates of growth and the provision of public welfare. But African societies entered a stage of profound crisis in the late 1970s/early 1980s as a result of the recession in the world market and the structural problems of the state capitalist model of development. Where as only 10 out of 34 sub-Saharan African countries experienced negative per capita GDP growth rates between 1965 and 1980, only nine registered any per capita GDP growth rate between 1980 and 1987 (Helleiner, 1990; World Bank, 1989). Average GDP growth rates for all SSA countries fell from 6.1 per cent in 1965-73 to -1.3 per cent in 1987. Agriculture, industry and services registered marked declines in rates of growth, with industry falling from 13.5 per cent in 1965-73 to -1.2 per cent in 1980-87. The same poor record is demonstrated in export volume and terms of trade. The total debt of SSA countries jumped from US  $21.1 billion in 1976 to US $137.8 billion in 1987. The ratio of external debt to GDP increased from 45.2 per cent in 1981 to 66.1 per cent in 1986 (IMF, 1988; Taylor, 1989). Table 3 highlights some of the negative trends in economic performance.

The figures for export volumes in 1987 are estimates. Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1989.

The crisis narrowed urban-rural terms of trade and differentials in social livelihood (Jamal and Weeks, 1988). This did not, however, strengthen rural welfare and urban-rural integration as most economies experienced sharp declines in their major macro-economic and social indicators. It was mainly a question of lowering urban living standards without necessarily raising those of the rural communities. Available data for 11 African countries in Table 4 show the effects of the crisis on public expenditure on education and health. The percentage of total expenditure on education declined in seven countries, and on health it declined in nine, even though only four countries cut their overall budget deficits as a percentage of their gross national product. Stewart reckoned that real government expenditure per head fell in 55 per cent of African countries between 1980 and 1984 (Stewart, 1987). The situation would have deteriorated in most countries in the mid-to-late 1980s.

Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1989.

Radical reform programmes, influenced or initiated by the IMF and the World Bank, have been introduced to check the unprecedented economic decline. The reforms aim to restructure economic relations in the production and consumption of commodities. The restructuring primarily affects incomes, public welfare and prices, which in turn affect the configurations of power. The aim is to eliminate distortions associated with the expansion of the post-colonial state by giving the market a relatively freer hand in the allocation of resources. These distortions are to be found in the exchange rates, tariff régimes, the organization of parastatals, interest rates and public expenditure. It is a major challenge to the state capitalist model of macro-economic management and the values and group interests that have been nurtured around it.

Rolling back the state does not only affect popular classes and groups, it also affects ruling class forces. Large-scale public expenditure, as we have seen, was not just a strategy for protecting the poor, it was also an avenue for dominant groups to siphon off public resources. The same applies to over-valued exchange rates, discriminatory tariffs, the establishment of parastatals and low interest rates, all of which played crucial roles in the accumulation of capital, class formation and the subsidy of the consumption habits of the rich and powerful. Structural adjustment poses, therefore, problems for all classes and groups. In fact, the economic reforms seek to purify the business groups, provide a new type of legitimacy for their class rule and consolidate their positions in the wider political economy. Such a project is to be achieved at the expense of the nationalist coalition and social contract that underpinned the state capitalist model of development.

Market reformers seek to reconstitute the relationship between foreign and local capital (liberalization strengthens the hands of the former), restructure agrarian relations to support export agriculture and hold back the urban classes of workers, sections of middle class professionals and the urban poor. It is not surprising that the strongest opponents of the reforms are a new coalition of middle class professionals, industrial unions, student organizations and the urban dispossessed. Pressures from such coalitions have led to a number of riots in Algeria, Benin, Egypt, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia and Zambia. Given the benefits that are likely to accrue to rural communities because of the price reforms and devaluation, some governments have tried to mobilize the rural groups to counter the political weight of the organized urban sector (Gyimah-Boadi, 1989), but the response so far has been lukewarm. Peasants remain sceptical of crucial aspects of the reforms such as fluctuations in prices, the withdrawal of subsidies from farm inputs, escalating costs of production, and general levels of inflation that affect their consumption of traded goods.

Struggles to protect living standards in the context of crisis and adjustment tend to take on a democratic character. Organized groups demand the institutionalization of collective bargaining, the independence of unions and associations and respect for the rule of law and civil liberties. These are considered to be critical for holding employers and state authorities accountable for their economic policies. Social movements are emboldened by the collapse of the post-colonial social contract and growth rates to press for the reconstitution of the relationship between the state and civil society. Repressive policies to support the implementation of adjustment programmes have not been effective in controlling dissent. Military and one-party forms of rule have come under increasing opposition from organized groups and individuals. Co-opted unions and associations agitate for organizational autonomy from established parties and governments to defend the declining welfare of their members (the Congo, Zambia). Current developments seem to contradict the predictions of neo-liberal theory which expects the business class to play a leading role in democratization (Diamond, 1988). The market reforms, it is argued, will liberate the enterprising potentials of the business groups and encourage them to opt for more democratic modes of government.

Although some business groups and organizations have sided with the popular groups in demanding the reintroduction of multi-party rule in such countries as Benin, Kenya, and Zambia, most of the demonstrations for democracy have been organized by opposition groups and parties with traditional sympathies for the aspirations of the poor. Even those who have joined the pro-democracy movement from the top have done so in the context of advancing the general interests of the populace and advocating for development programmes that would protect the poor and vulnerable sections of society. Contrary to neo-liberal formulations, democratization is seen by the majority of dissident groups as an instrument for obstructing structural adjustment and protecting some of the gains in public welfare and living standards threatened by the reforms. A number of military and one-party régimes have come under considerable pressure to initiate programmes for transitions to multi-party rule. Indeed, partly encouraged by the experiences in Eastern Europe, there has been an intense debate for multi-party democracy in most African countries. The link between alternative strategies of development and democracy has featured in most of these debates. Some governments, such as Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mozambique, Zaire and Zambia, have even been forced to initiate plans for transitions to multi-party rule. Other régimes like those of Kenya and Sierra Leone have not conceded much ground to the opposition groups. Similarly, struggles in the existing democracies of the Gambia, Senegal and Zimbabwe have focused on the question of curtailing the post-colonial dominance of the ruling parties and extending the social content of democracy (Bathily, 1989; Moyo, 1989).

The next section examines the politics of transition from authoritarian military rule to democracy. Issues relating to democratization are different from those of sustainable democracy. Sustainability, as we have seen, deals with a complex of economic, social and political factors which may profoundly influence the orientation and character of democratization. Democratization is, however, explicitly political. It concerns the processes of liberalization in the key areas of political life, viz. the demilitarization of the state apparatus; the strengthening of civil society and its institutions; and the democratization of the rules of economic and political competition. The nature of the links between civil and political society occupies a central position in the dynamics and regulation of democratization. I discuss these issues against the background of the Nigerian experience.

2 Riots in the West Indies, Mauritius and the Gold Coast culminated in the decision by the British government to review the Colonial Development Act of 1929. The Watson Report on the riots set the stage for the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945. See Parliamentary Command Papers 6174 and 6175 (UK) 1940.

3 Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia.