The Róbinson Rojas Archive.- National Summit of Africa ( February 2000): Democracy and Human Rights.- RRojas Databank: Analysis and Information on economics, development, research methods, globalization, poverty, sustainability, environment, human rights, China, Chile, Asia, Africa, Latin America, America Latina. Puro Chile. The Memory of the people

National Summit on Africa - February 2000
Democracy and Human Rights

Abstract

1. As the decade of the 1980s drew to a close, the world was in the midst of what many observers described as a worldwide democratic revolution. A convergence of political, economic, social, and cultural crises resulted in the collapse of authoritarianism around the world symbolized most dramatically by the fall of the Berlin Wall and culminating with the breakup of the Soviet communist empire and the overthrow of apartheid in South Africa. The enormity of these events was but a reflection of a deeper questioning about the validity of authoritarian solutions to socio-political and economic problems. Both the dramatic events themselves as well as the ensuing open and public debates surrounding their meaning were quickly communicated worldwide via satellite communications technology. Almost on a daily basis global developments were beamed into the homes of people living in the most remote corners of the world. The trend away from authoritarian rule and towards democracy in many places seemed contagious, awakening democratic yearnings in societies long characterized by authoritarian rule. Nowhere was this more true than in Africa.

2. Responding to the prospects of being marginalized in the world community as a result of the end of the Cold War, Africans from all walks of life realized that more than ever, Africans themselves were going to have to find African solutions to their problems. For many observers, the 1980s had been considered "The Lost Decade" for Africa because many of the continent's economies suffered under the multiple legacies of economic mismanagement, political corruption, and deep social malaise. The confluence of a radically changing global environment and the profound crises of African political economy created new opportunities for change to which both the international donor community and African civil society dramatically responded. A segment of the international community, headed by Western democratic regimes and multilateral financial institutions, identified misguided state-directed economic policies and bad governance by African regimes as the root cause of economic and social crises. By the end of the 1980s, donors were not only insisting on economic policy reform but were also demanding the establishment of good governance as a condition for further economic assistance to Africa.

3. Simultaneously, civil society, which had been rendered virtually extinct by nearly three decades of autocratic domination, re-emerged with vigor and vitality. African associational life assumed dynamic qualities involving the (re)emergence of a wide variety of populist, professional, and political movements that gave expression to long suppressed democratic aspirations. By the late 1980s civic associations had begun to mobilize around political issues. These groups were now demanding not only a return to democratic pluralism, but also social justice and guarantees of human and civil rights.

4. Affected by pressures emanating from both within and outside their societies, autocratic regimes in Africa began to yield to the democratic impulses of society by the early 1990s. By that time, all but a handful of authoritarian regimes on the continent had embarked on political liberalization programs leaning towards multiparty democracy. However, as this decade comes to an end, political liberalization has not automatically resulted in the establishment and consolidation of democracy. Indeed, there has been significant backsliding in which older authoritarian practices are now being concealed behind a newer "democratic" facade.

5. The causes of African democracy and human rights are now at a critical juncture. At the very moment when the international community should be stepping up its support for democratic forces in Africa, providing the necessary moral, political, and economic impetus for fundamental change, there is a danger that donor fatigue and changing world priorities may lead to a lessening of such support. What is more troubling than apparent donor fatigue, is the tendency in the international community to virtually ignore the repressive tendencies of those they regard as the new African leaders. The international community seems satisfied now to settle for political stability in Africa rather than to insist on democracy and human rights for all. It is critical that constituency groups such as the National Summit on Africa not allow this to happen and, in fact, do all that is necessary to place African democracy and human rights at the head of the African agenda of the United States.

6. This paper has three purposes:

a) To critically assess the progress that has been made in Africa over the past decade toward promoting the emergence and consolidation of democracy and the protection of human rights of all citizens. Particular attention will be devoted to the plight of women and youth. An effort will be made to ensure that the analysis that follows accounts for gender; that is, sensitive to the roles and contributions of women in all aspects of life and politics.

b) To identify and expand successful U.S.- supported projects committed to promoting democracy and human rights as well as initiating innovative approaches that would enable these interests to make further gains. It must be acknowledged that despite the invaluable support of external actors, the drive for democracy and human rights is, for the most part, a result of concerted action on the part of African citizens themselves. However, external supporters must be careful not to usurp the political space that African peoples are opening for themselves to express their own views and aspirations for change.

c) To make recommendations on how the future African policy of the United States can best promote the democracy and human rights aspirations of African peoples.

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Executive Summary

1. Affected by pressures emanating from both within and outside their societies, autocratic regimes in Africa began to yield to the democratic impulses of society by the early 1990s. By that time, all but a handful of authoritarian regimes on the continent had embarked on political liberalization programs leaning towards multiparty democracy. However, as this decade comes to an end, political liberalization has not automatically resulted in the establishment and consolidation of democracy. Indeed, there has been significant backsliding in which older authoritarian practices are now being concealed behind a newer "democratic" facade.

2. The causes of African democracy and human rights are now at a critical juncture. At the very moment when the international community should be stepping up its support for democratic forces in Africa, providing the necessary moral, political, and economic impetus for fundamental change, there is a danger that donor fatigue and changing world priorities may lead to a lessening of such support. What is more troubling than apparent donor fatigue is the tendency in the international community to virtually ignore the repressive tendencies of those they regard as the new African leaders. The international community seems satisfied now to settle for political stability in Africa rather than to insist on democracy and human rights for all. It is critical that constituency groups such as the National Summit on Africa not allow this to happen and, in fact, do all that is necessary to place African democracy and human rights at the head of the African agenda of the United States.

3. While popular forces in Africa must be given credit for "pushing the democratic envelope" in their respective countries, external actors have also tried to have an impact on this process. This external support has come mainly from multilateral aid agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Union (EU), and donor countries such as Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. The multilateral aid agencies claim only to be interested in good governance in Africa, but the same enabling environment that facilitates good governance is also favorable to democratization. Good governance exists when political regimes become accountable, responsible, transparent, and respectful of the rule of law. Bilateral donors in particular have emphasized both the need for good governance and political liberalization.

4. There is general agreement among scholars and statesmen alike that the processes of economic and political liberalization in Africa must be analyzed and understood in the context of a broader dynamic of global transformation. While substantive changes have taken place, many of these transitions have proved illusory, creating pseudo-democracies or democracies by default. The global dimension remains pronounced but unpredictable in Africa. For example, international financial institutions dominate economic policy and resource mobilization on the continent yet are ill-equipped "to play political midwife, while the diplomatic services of Western industrialized countries are seldom able to counter the strategies of incumbent regimes to adopt variations of the 'Chinese model,' market reforms accompanied by limited or deferred political liberalization." ¹

5. Despite some false steps and setbacks, democratization, if not democracy, seems to be re-establishing roots in many parts of Africa. It is too soon to talk about the consolidation of sustainable democracy in most places. In fact, in most places, one can only speak of fragments of democracy. However, if there is the political will among contending political elites to maintain a democratic course, over time fragmentary gains will tend to accumulate, enhancing the possibilities that democratic culture and habits will become common place. To be sure, there are places where one can speak only of procedural democracy but what is significant is that in recent years the forces of democracy have undermined the autocratic projects of some African regimes. Yet, for most places on the continent, democratic consolidation is likely to be slow, halting, and uneven--in the short term at least. Despite slow, halting, and irregular progress toward democratic consolidation in Africa, it seems reasonable to assume that the overall trend will move in the positive direction. These gains can be greatly enhanced with the continued support of outside supporters of democracy such as the United States.

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I. Introduction: An Historical Perspective

Democracy in Africa

1. Democracy is not new to Africa. Dating back to ancient times, there existed some African societies that understood and adhered to the principles of democracy.² A characteristic of these traditional societies that is most pertinent to the cross-cultural debate on democracy is the autonomous and participatory nature of their decision-making processes. These systems rested on the devolution of power down to the local units-- territorial divisions, clans, lineages, and extended families, with the individual as a vital member of the community. Put in the reverse order, these political systems--which included empires, kingdoms, "republics," and stateless societies--were structured in a hierarchy in which the basic unit was the family, extended to the lineage, the clan, on to territorially defined entities. In this participatory system of governance, decisions were generally reached by consensus and broad-based consultation through group representation at various levels.

2. Under these types of systems, extended families in villages chose their heads who together formed a council of elders. Without the council, the chief, and even the king was powerless. In the deliberations of the council any adult could speak, and council members could deliberate for as long as was necessary to arrive at a consensus. As one African author commented, "The moral order was robustly collective.…Majority rule, winner-take-all, or other forms of zero-sum games were not acceptable alternatives to consensus decision making."³ This process of sharing power at all levels and of respecting the rights of every individual is particularly pronounced in the segmentary lineage system, which emphasizes the devolution of power down to the level of the family and even to the individual. Relations among local groups are seen as a balance of power, maintained through competition in a hierarchy of levels. While relations are competitive at one level, in another situation, the formerly competitive groups come together in mutual alliance against an outside group.

3. In view of the manner in which the segmentary lineage system functions, it should not be surprising that Somali society, one of the most illustrative of this system, was susceptible to the manipulation of the clan rivalry by former President Siad Barre. Nor should the assertiveness of the autonomous identity of the clans under Somali warlords, which led to the destruction of the central authority and the collapse of the modern Somali state, be surprising either. The manner in which the Somalis joined ranks to resist foreign intervention (when intervention went beyond relief supplies and took sides in their internal conflicts), demonstrated the way in which "the formerly competitive groups merge in mutual alliance against an outside group."⁴

4. In the context of modern Africa, democracy has, of course, acquired a more universalizing meaning. Among the principles of democracy that have gained universal validity are that governments rule in accordance with the will of the people; adherance to the rule of the law, separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary; and have respect for fundamental human rights and civil liberties. These principles are safeguarded by transparency, freedom of expression (and the press), access to information, and accountability to the public. Democracy also implies accommodation of differences and a special responsibility for the protection of minorities.

5. In Africa, the situation is complicated by the fact that the modern state is primarily a conglomeration of many ethnic groups, which makes it difficult to speak of majority and minority. Given the fact that these countries are still in the process of nation-building, groups that find themselves threatened with a minority status might tend to resist such a stratifying national framework, and might prefer to "exit" if they have the capacity to do so. This poses a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the regime, if not the state itself, calling for a major restructuring of the constitutive system. Even though an electoral system should allow for the protection and participation of minorities in the short run, the goal in the long run must be to transcend these differences and apply democracy on a non-ethnic, non-racial, and non-religious basis-- a truly unifying concept of nationhood. All of the populace must come to feel that their citizenship rights are guaranteed and that their rights are equal to those of fellow citizens in other identity groups.

6. The main point to underscore is that while democracy is universally valued, it needs to be considered in context of African realities and it must make effective use of indigenous values, institutions, and social mores. However, such consideration must not be allowed to degenerate into a relativistic pretext for authoritarianism, which is itself inimical to most indigenous African political theory and practice. In traditional Africa, most rulers governed with the consent of the people who participated broadly in their own self-administration, were free to express their will, and held their leaders to high standards of transparency and accountability. Certain elements of traditional political theory and practice, in particular popular participation and consensus building, are still worth considering when developing principles of democracy that are appropriate within the African context.

7. As the decade of the 1980s drew to a close, the world was in the midst of what many observers described as a worldwide democratic revolution. A convergence of political, economic, social, and cultural crises resulted in the collapse of authoritarianism symbolized most dramatically by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the overthrow of apartheid in South Africa, and the collapse of the Soviet communist empire. The enormity of these events was but a reflection of a deeper questioning about the validity of authoritarian solutions to socio-political and economic problems. These dramatic events and the open and public debates that followed them were quickly communicated to all parts of the world through satellite communications technology. Almost daily, global developments were beamed into the homes of people living in the most remote corners of the world. The trend away from authoritarian rule and towards democracy in many places seemed contagious, awakening democratic yearnings in societies long characterized by authoritarian rule. Nowhere was this more true than in Africa.

8. Affected by pressures emanating from both within and outside their societies, by the early 1990s autocratic regimes in Africa began to yield to the democratic impulses of society. By that time all but a handful of authoritarian regimes on the continent had embarked on political liberalization programs leaning towards multiparty democracy. However, as this decade comes to an end, political liberalization has not yet automatically resulted in the establishment and consolidation of democracy. Indeed, there has been significant backsliding in which older authoritarian practices are now being concealed behind newer "democratic" facades. Thus, as a contemporary form, democracy in Africa is still very much a work in progress.

Africa and the Universality of Human Rights⁵

9. Like democracy, the concept of human rights is not foreign to Africa. While there is considerable variation of cultural perspectives on details, the principles of human rights are rooted in the universal quest for human dignity. These principles have become largely adopted by the international community and enshrined in the International Bill of Rights (composed of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) as well as a wide array of other human rights instruments.

10. And yet, human rights principles are not without controversy relating to both normative formulation and enforcement mechanisms. While universalism seems self-evident, relativism, whether based on culture, religion, or differences in public policy priorities, is a reality dictated by conditions on the ground. To appreciate the dynamics involved, it is necessary to disaggregate the clusters of universalists and relativists. It is perhaps relatively easy to group together all those inspired by the ideals of universal dignity as articulated in international human rights instruments. But even here it is often argued that those who support universality may be driven more by vested political interests than by altruism of the ideals. The selective application of human rights principles by those espousing universality raises questions of objectivity or partiality based on the interests of the powers concerned.

11. When it comes to those collectively labeled relativists, the composition of the agents and the perspectives involved is more complex. The context in which relativism is invoked is by no means monolithic. As much as there are those who would plead the defense of relativism, there are those who seek the protection of universalism against the relativists. Stated in other words, the victims of human rights violations in the context of the nation-state look and appeal to the principles and mechanisms of universalism to provide them with international protection against their own national or local authorities. On the one hand, not all relativists are offenders; some may indeed be motivated by competing ideals within their own cultures or at least by a different order of policy priorities. African human rights scholars have, for instance, emphasized the need to balance the rights of the individual with those of the community as embodied in the African Charter of Human and People's Rights. As Makau wa Matua notes:

The concept of the group-centered individual in Africa delicately entwines rights and duties, and harmonizes the individual with the society. Such a concept does not necessarily see society…organized either as the community or the state…as the individual's primary antagonist.⁶

12. On the other hand, unless certain standards are recognized as universal, serious violations may be condoned because they happen to be tolerated or sanctioned by the cultural traditions of the society or the community in question. Human rights ideals represent a goal that no nation or society has as yet achieved. They are aspirations that are pursued with varying degrees of success. But the sequence of requirements begins with the definition of fundamental standards which, in turn, begins with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While the adoption of international standards does not guarantee their enforcement, norm- setting is a prerequisite to enforcement and the fact that a gap exists between the set standards and their enforcement provides a basis for demanding remedial action. The fact that international practice has not yet lived up to the agreed norms underscores the need to develop a more effective mechanism of enforcement.

Objectives

13. This paper has three purposes:

b) To identify and expand successful U.S.- supported projects committed to promoting democracy and human rights as well as initiating innovative approaches that would enable these interests to make further gains. It must be acknowledged that despite the invaluable support of external actors, the drive for democracy and human rights is for the most part a result of concerted action on the part of African citizens themselves. However, external supporters must be careful not to usurp the political space that African peoples are opening for themselves to express their own views and aspirations for change.

c) To make recommendations on how the future African policy of the United States can best promote the democracy and human rights aspirations of African peoples.

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II. The Principles of Contemporary Democracy and Human Rights in Africa

14. As we have already noted, democracy and human rights are not new to Africa. However, the concepts have been expanded so as to have meaning at the level of the multi-ethnic nation-state within the context of a world community of nation-states.

15. After decades of authoritarian rule, there now appear to be democratic openings in Africa, and scholars and policymakers alike are attempting to understand and, in some cases, influence the direction and consolidation of these changes. Much of the new scholarly literature on the subject is concerned with making a case for the significance of what appear to be democratic openings,⁷ or with making a contribution to democratic theory as it relates to Africa,⁸ or with understanding the relationship between structural variables such as economic development, cultural pluralism, and single- or multi-party systems.⁹

16. The literature on democratic theory is rife with terminological confusion and ideological bias. However, it seems safe to say that what is understood by the term "democracy" in Africa today is some form of liberal democracy. The liberal conception of democracy advocates limiting the public realm, and rule by the people. Bratton and van de Walle cogently note:

Democracy is a form of regime whose legitimacy derives from the principle of popular sovereignty: Namely, that ordinary citizens are equally endowed with the right and ability to govern themselves...[But]...modern democracy has inexorably come to mean representative democracy.¹⁰

17. The most widely used conceptualization of liberal democracy is offered by Robert Dahl. Dahl identifies seven defining elements of his version of liberal democracy, polyarchy:¹¹

a) Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials;

b) Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon;

c) Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials;

d) Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in government;

e) Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined;

f) Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law; and

g) Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties.

18. Taking into consideration the particular political culture of developing societies Schmitter and Karl¹² adds two more items to Dahl's taxonomy:

a) Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subject to overriding opposition from elected officials (e.g. military officers, entrenched civil servants, or state managers); and

b) The polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political system.

19. The conception held by most Africans today of what is referred to on the continent as democracy is often based upon ideas similar to those mentioned above. For example, the former Nigerian Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo, has identified the minimum standard of democracy as:

Periodic election of political leadership through the secret ballot; popular participation of all adults in the election process; choice of programs and personalities in the elections; an orderly succession; openness of the society; an independent judiciary; freedom of the press to include freedom of ownership; institutional pluralism; a democratic culture and democratic spirit; and fundamental human rights.¹³

20. Another African, Achola Pala-Okeyo, approaches the subject of democracy from a philosophic perspective, attempting to capture its irreducible essence. She asserts:

Central to the concept of democracy as a philosophical construct are equality, justice and fairness. As a political idea democracy is premised on the assumption that the people are both the subject and object of democratic governance. This means that the masses of people should enjoy basic freedoms including those of association, speech, shelter and food. Through leadership and participation in institutions of public sector and economic management and the mediation of culture, people, living under democracy, ideally have the political space to engage in fashioning the type of development they want.¹⁴

21. She goes on to make a case for the full participation of women in all aspects of political transition and development. Women must be adequately represented in key decision-making positions, and actively participate as representatives in legislative bodies, and the executive and judicial branches of government. Furthermore, laws must be supportive of women.

22. Reinforcing the demand for gender equity in the democratization process Maria Nzomo, the Kenyan feminist scholar, asserts that African women "want gender-based interests to be mainstreamed into the new democratic agenda, and they want to participate on an equal footing with men in the democratization process...[women] need to seize the opportunity presented by multi-party democracy."¹⁵

23. Nowhere in the world is there a perfect form of liberal democracy. In Africa, in most cases, we can only speak of democracy as being under construction. Democratic consolidation is a gradual and, usually, tentative process. At this time, it is more appropriate to speak of Africa in many cases as being involved in the earliest phases of democratization. Democratization is a continuous process of change involving a steady, but clearly observable, expansion and deepening of democratic rights, opportunities, institutions, and so forth. This process develops over time and it is unrealistic to think that the legacy of decades of colonial oppression and authoritarian rule can simply be eliminated overnight. Democratic transformation in Africa will take time and will be fraught with lapses, if not temporary setbacks. Its long-term success will depend on promoting institution building, animating civil society, expanding social opportunity, and enhancing economic well-being.

24. Larry Diamond distinguishes between electoral democracy and liberal democracy. Electoral democracy exists where there are regular, competitive, multi-party elections that can be considered as at least somewhat free and fair. This is a form of procedural democracy and nothing more. As has been suggested above, the standard for liberal democracy is much higher. Consequently, Diamond asserts that more common than liberal democracy is a form of pseudo-democracy. In such cases, incumbent parties use their offices to manipulate constitutions and other political institutions to their advantage and to the disadvantage of actual or would-be opponents. Incumbents use various means to keep from negotiating a truly new and meaningful social contract with the formal opposition as well as the common citizenry. The unfortunate outgrowth of such a situation is that in recent years, external actors seem to have come to accept procedural democracy that stops well short of the standards of liberal democracy. Thus, the struggle of the masses for a satisfactory level of liberal democracy is likely to be extended.¹⁶

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III. Patterns of Regime Change in Contemporary Africa

Colonization and Decolonization

25. European colonialism fundamentally transformed culture and society in Africa, interrupting the flow of human history on the continent, and introducing institutional mutations that continue to have a profound effect today. Crawford Young has noted:

The creation of the African colonial state coincided with the historical zenith of virulent racism. The colonial construction of the African savage other permeated all spheres of policy thought. Racism was always present in colonial encounters, to be sure; imperialism is the parent of race as an ideology of human difference. But the arrogance of race was never stronger than at the moment of colonial onslaught on Africa. African culture had no redeeming value; only a wholly new African might be worthy of the colonial order, tailored from imported cloth.¹⁷

26. While claiming to have a "civilizing" and "development" mission, European colonialism dominated its African colonies primarily for resource extraction. Colonial states were artificially created for administrative convenience. However, rather than becoming citizens in these newly created colonial states, Africans were mere subjects.¹⁸ European settlers retained their citizenship in the polities from whence they came but, as a consequence of European colonialism, Africans were deprived of such rights in their own homelands. In addition to this, the wealth of Africa was ripped away through a process of unequal exchange; in the end, leaving a negative balance sheet. Geoffrey Kay has noted that the problem with colonialism was that it did not "underdevelop" Africa enough, thus, leaving it with infrastructure that was unsuitable for the challenges of modernization.¹⁹ The renowned Guyanese scholar, Walter Rodney, went further, asserting that the best thing that colonialism did for Africa was to end!²⁰

27. Rather than being a central part of the agenda of European colonialists in Africa, democracy was an afterthought. Finding colonial domination a drag on the domestic economy after the Second World War and facing mounting pressures for independence from Africans, European colonialists agreed to independence for their colonial possessions. On their departure, they attempted to introduce nominally democratic institutions and welfare states in their wake. Without the culture of liberal democracy and without the resource endowments necessary to buttress a welfare state, autocracy in the form of civilian single-party or military regimes rapidly emerged as alternatives, providing the post-colonial state with the illusions of authority and control. In this climate, the democratic yearnings of the people were suppressed.

The Rise and Fall of Democracy's First Wave in Africa

28. Following independence most African states retained political institutions patterned on those of their former colonial rulers. Francophone Africa adopted France's presidential form of government, with its disposition toward strong executive leadership. Anglophone Africa was assigned a parliamentary form of government, designed to encourage representative democracy and to monitor the actions of the executive through an assembly of popularly elected delegates to a national assembly. Political competition throughout Africa was channeled through competitive, multi-party electoral systems even though in some places only one party dominated.

29. There were great expectations among observers that these new African states would simply take the best of Western democracies and use them to form efficient, effective, and equitable models for their own societies. Soon, however, it became apparent that it was not as easy as it had seemed to graft Western institutions and patterns of behavior onto Africa. One African state after the other began to reject these Western forms and to create hybrids of their own. In some places, dominant political parties became de facto or de jure single party systems, in the service of authoritarian civilian regimes. In other places, competitive party systems were replaced by authoritarian military regimes.

30. By the mid-1980s, 60 percent of Africa's fifty independent countries had military governments and, among the remaining civilian regimes, only five--Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal and Zimbabwe-- had competitive party systems. Even in countries in which civilian regimes existed, national elections tended not to present voters with clear political alternatives. Instead, elections merely served to present the illusion of participation, creating pseudo-democracies.

31. Moreover, rather than turning to pre-colonial forms of indigenous democracy, the tendency was to construct a political order on the foundations of the autocratic colonial state. Despite the constant invocation of nationalistic and populist themes in support of developmental objectives, African regimes of all ideological tendencies, in the period stretching roughly between 1966 and 1990, favored neo-patrimonial, autocratic rule over democracy. The post-colonial successor state began to look remarkably similar to its colonial predecessor.

32. Poverty, underdevelopment, economic dependence, ethnic and class conflict, lack of experience with democratic practice, fragile political and economic institutions--all with their roots in the colonial era-- coupled with a revolution in rising expectations among the populace, fueled the demise of Africa's initial experiment in pluralist democracy. Africa's democratic experience was replaced by locally inspired authoritarianism, often with the willing assistance of former colonial powers and their multinational business interests.

33. Despite the detrimental influence of exploitative global economic interests fueled by the distorting international priorities imposed by Cold War imperatives, much of the blame for democracy's initial failure in Africa has been laid at the feet of those responsible for governing and leading national development. Political leaders were accused of having approached the democratic project with little enthusiasm and commitment. The late Claude Ake captured the essence of this problem when he wrote:

Without exception, all nationalist leaders believed that one important lesson to be learned from the humiliation of colonization was the need to overcome not only political weaknesses but also military, economic, and technological ones. At the same time the former colonial masters were promoting the idea of development African leaders adopted the ideology of development to replace that of independence. But as it turned out, what was adopted was not so much an ideology of development as a strategy of power that merely capitalized on the objective need for development.²¹

34. Consequently, nationalist regimes came to engage in rent-seeking behavior designed mainly to establish effective state control but also intended to further enrich and empower the expanding class of military elites and their civilian counterparts that were governing the country. The net losers were the ordinary men and women of Africa who continued to suffer serious economic hardships and declining living standards while being denied basic human rights and political freedoms.

The Collapse of the Autocratic State

35. While it will never be fully known what the exact conditions that led to the failure of "developmental dictatorship" were, the reality was that by the mid-1980s Africa was experiencing a series of crises in the state, economy, and society which brought into question all manner of authoritarian rule. The massive failure and virtual collapse of the post-colonial autocratic state is rooted in a multitude of factors, some of external origin others found within African societies themselves, but all related to a series of profound political and economic crises. Indeed, the economic crisis has been so deep and pronounced that the 1980s have been declared the continent's "lost decade," as a combination of economic mismanagement and adverse global trends yielded a downward spiral that undermined growth, hindered production, and fostered deepening poverty in scores of African countries.²²

36. Three important factors help explain the challenge to the autocratic state which enabled Africa's democratization to take place after 1989:

The weakening of most African states by a prolonged fiscal crisis; the increasing control of international financial institutions and the allied bilateral agencies of the industrialized nations in determining economic policy; and the shift of Western powers (especially the United States) after the end of the Cold War from tolerance of and alliance with authoritarian regimes to liberalization of their systems.²³

37. The continent's economic difficulties served to highlight its political problems. The excesses of bloated, inefficient and ineffective state bureaucracies and corrupt, repressive authoritarian regimes were laid bare for the world to see. African authoritarian regimes had not only stifled popular participation in politics and distorted the policy process, they had also ceased to be accountable to the populace.

38. While private African and non-African groups and institutions steadily increased their efforts on behalf of human rights, civil liberties, and pluralist democracy during the 1980s, their overall influence on the established political order was probably minimal. To be sure, the dramatic developments in Eastern Europe emboldened African civil society. Yet, were it not for the economic factors identified above, it seems unlikely that non-governmental organization (NGO) activity alone could have been sufficient to cause the collapse of the autocratic state.

39. Clearly, Africans themselves have been instrumental in both the "first independence" as well as the "second independence" periods in deciding the details of transition from colonial and authoritarian rule respectively. However, they "seldom determined the decision to introduce political reforms solely or independently. A complex and dynamic interplay between external and local forces determined particular outcomes along a continuum from renewed authoritarianism to various degrees of liberalization and democratization."²⁴

40. Whatever the mix of strategies, external forces were often able to narrow the options available to recalcitrant regimes, and to encourage and bolster insurgent groups. However, these same external forces were also prepared to subordinate democracy to other geostrategic considerations, as in the case of hydrocarbon-rich Algeria, where in 1992 democratic elections were about to install an Islamic government, or as happened in Liberia and Madagascar where, in the absence of any compelling external interest in the outcome, contestants were let to fight it out.

41. In the final analysis, a convergence developed between the objectives of the providers of international aid to Africa and the African people themselves. The aid donors were now insisting on good governance, political liberalization, and democratization, or some combination thereof, as a condition for further economic assistance. No longer was the rent-seeking behavior of African regimes to be tolerated as a price for the pursuit of development. Simultaneously, activists and the popular masses in dozens of countries voiced a broad-based repudiation of predatory authoritarian rule, making it clear that people had become tired of official corruption, authoritarianism, poverty, and the regular denial of their human and political rights.

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IV. The Role of Civil Society and Opposition Parties

Civil Society and the State

42. Democracy's link to civil society introduces another critical component in the fostering of political democracy, good governance, and human rights in Africa. Whatever may be the debate surrounding the concept of civil society and its relationship to the state, it is clear that in all parts of Africa, the most recent wave of political liberalization and democratization has been spearheaded by civil society.

43. In a seminal article on this subject, Jean-Francois Bayart defined civil society as the political space between the household and the state.²⁵ It is outside the formal political arena, but it can be drawn in when there exists a political crisis. The interactive nature of civil society and the state is concisely developed by Diamond. He conceives of civil society as the

realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from "society" in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable. Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state.²⁶

Actors in civil society need the protection of an institutionalized legal order to guarantee their autonomy and freedom of action. Thus civil society not only restricts state power but legitimates state authority when that authority is based on the rule of law.

44. Diamond's definition excludes the individual and family life, inward-looking group activity (e.g., for recreation, entertainment, or spirituality), the profit-making enterprise of individual business firms, and political efforts to take control of the state. This seems too restrictive in the African, Arab, and Islamic contexts, especially under conditions where the separation of church and state is more fiction than fact, and where sports, recreational, and business enterprises, for example, are often forums for the articulation of public issues and concerns. The common overflow of the traditional and the modern, the private and the public, and the secular and the sectarian in Arab-African societies makes it impractical to apply restrictive definitions of civil society.

45. Whatever definition one uses, the first, and most basic, democratic function of civil society is to check the excesses of state power.²⁷ This function has two dimensions: to monitor and restrain the exercise of power by the state, and to democratize authoritarian states. Mobilizing civil society is a major means of exposing the abuses and undermining the legitimacy of undemocratic regimes.²⁸

46. Civil society is not society writ-large, but only a subset of it. What defines civil society is its agenda. It is activated when autonomous associations adopt and act upon a civic agenda. In that sense the manifestation of civil society tends to be situational and intermittent. These autonomous groups may not have been born as civic organizations, but they are moved by circumstances to engage in politics. They might demand constitutional reform, governmental accountability, their human and political rights, and an end to official corruption. The groups that comprise the leadership in civil society are usually intellectuals, artists, lawyers, doctors, labor leaders, church assemblies, women's movements, and student associations.

47. In contrast to the leadership of the African independence movement, this new wave of protest is led by what we might call a "third sector," in contrast to the state and the mass public. In this category we would find what Bates has defined as "fixed human capital, those people who have invested in skills that are... imperfectly transferable elsewhere."²⁹ It is either difficult or undesirable for individuals in this category to walk with their feet, and take their skills abroad where they expect to find gainful employment. For better or worse, they feel bound to struggle at home.

48. Although Bates includes old guard politicians in the third sector, we do not. This category of political activists are too tied to the established order to constitute a force of change in civil society. A by-product of the re-emergence of civil society has been the proliferation of domestic human rights groups and the development of linkages between domestic and international civil society organizations.

Civil Society in Action

49. It is important to note that at the grassroots level in Africa today, women leaders are mobilizing and demanding political accountability on the part of the leaders of the state; women leaders are organizing to redefine political participation in the democratic process. For example, local women lawyers in the past ten years have organized themselves in order to provide civic education and human rights representation for the masses. In Uganda, Kenya, Senegal, and Madagascar to name just a few places, women lawyers have established important locally based NGOs that have linked up with other organizations pursuing the same objectives (e.g. national law societies and church groups). This endogenous process has been helped along by the development of linkages with international civil society organizations such as Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the International Association of Women Lawyers (FIDA).

50. The first signs of a resurgent civil society in this most recent wave of regime transformation began to appear in Africa at about the time of the overthrow of the Jaafar Nimeiri regime in Sudan in a populist uprising in 1985. However, it was not until about 1988 that there were clear manifestations of a genuine political force that one could roughly classify as civil society. Since then African civil society has not only grown--it has also changed, become emboldened, and focused on the spoils of national politics. In many cases it has been the decisive catalyst in change of regimes.³⁰

51. However, the effectiveness of civil society in bringing about regime change is highly contingent upon factors such as the relative strength of the incumbent regime, the role of external actors, the relative coherence of formal opposition groups, and internal and external political and economic factors. Moreover, even when it has been crucial in bringing about regime change, civil society's role is often eclipsed in the post-authoritarian phase.

52. Mainstream political parties use groups in civil society to their benefit, but often ignore them after achieving electoral victory. A good example of this is Zambia. In the 1991 presidential elections, President Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy successfully mobilized civil society organizations to achieve a decisive victory. Yet, after that victory, President Chiluba worked diligently to marginalize the very groups that had put him in office. He either repressed or co-opted church organizations and women's groups that had been instrumental in ensuring his victory. A further example of this process is demonstrated by the fact that few political parties that challenge autocratic rule have a clearly formulated agenda for achieving equality and women's empowerment. This is gradually changing, but it is too soon to declare any real commitment to guaranteeing women's empowerment by mainstream political parties.

53. Owing to its inchoate nature, civil society has been unable to play a direct role in polity formation and only indirectly contributes to democratization. Under current circumstances, civil society has not successfully fostered the creation of coherent mass movements that have a clear sense of identity. More often than not, civil society in Africa has comprised little more than a loose collection of groups with a vaguely defined common objective that often amounts to no more than a desire to oust a corrupt or incompetent authoritarian regime.

54. Another weakness of African civil society has been its ephemeral character. Too often the emergence of civil society stems from a political crisis in which autonomous groups are quickly co-opted by more institutionalized political forces such as opposition political parties. In cases where the autocratic order has been overturned, civil society often retreats to its previously passive self, re-emerging only with the onset of another political crisis. Under more difficult circumstances, civil society has simply chosen the "exit" option, disengaging completely from politics.

55. In order for civil society to have even a marginal impact on regime change, it must possess a clear vision and good timing. Its leaders must be able to identify openings in the political structure and to effectively act on those openings. Most often, groups become emboldened when they perceive that the risks of collective action are less than what they had been in the past and, at the same time, prospects that such activities will yield a desired outcome are perceived to have improved. For example, when the ascendant regime loses cohesion or is otherwise weakened, this may send a signal to potential opponents of the regime- - that an alliance can be formed with "soft-liners" in the government, thereby undermining authoritarian rule. Such developments in 1990-91 led to the marginalization and eventual ouster of the Kerekou regime in Benin, to the overturn of the Sassou-Nguesso government in Congo-Brazzaville, and to the dramatic loss of authority of the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko, in the former Zaire.

56. Under such circumstances, clear vision and good timing are everything. Should opposition groups be disorganized or misread the situation, their movements could fail to achieve their objectives. Opposition groups must not only be well organized and focused, they must correctly perceive when the opportunity structure is open. For example, in the summer of 1991, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria perceived itself strong enough to force the hand of the government of President Chadli Benjedid, which had initiated a liberalization process following the society-wide disturbances of late 1988. The FIS accused the government of attempting to rig upcoming multi-party parliamentary elections, and took to the streets in mass protest. When that protest turned violent, the government was quick to suppress the movement and quick to deal harshly with its leaders. Although elections were later allowed to proceed, the damage had already been done, with the army intervening in January 1992 to halt the electoral process altogether.

57. In Kenya in 1990, calls by disgruntled politicians as well as by elements in civil society for the reintroduction of multi-party democracy were greeted with political murder, unlawful imprisonment, and only a promise to try and make the only legal party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), work better. In both the Algerian and Kenyan cases, the timing was not right for civil society to be successful. However by 1997, even though it was not able to oust the incumbent and his party, Kenya's civil society was able to force the regime of President Moi to engage in limited constitutional reforms.

58. In contrast with the cases where civil society has met with failure, in some places (e.g. Ghana in 1968 and 1969, Sudan in 1964 and 1985, Benin in 1990 and 1991, and Madagascar in 1992) popular movements coupled with a recognition of the economic incompetence of political leadership, forced out authoritarian governments. In most cases the authoritarian regimes were replaced by civilian regimes through multi-party elections.

59. In many parts of Francophone Africa, civil society came to be manifested as national conferences³¹ in the early 1990s. This phenomenon, based both on traditional principles of village assemblies and the French Estates-General, first emerged in Benin when elements of civil society forced the Kerekou government to allow for a national dialogue in a constituent assembly to map out plans for political reform. This assembly, consisting of a myriad number of interest groups and associations, met over a period of a year to map out new organic laws to govern state-society relations. At its conclusion, the gathering set up legislative and executive bodies to serve as a transitional government leading up to multi-party elections. The developments in Benin had a contagious effect, spreading to such places as Niger, Mali, and Zaire. Initially, the incumbent regimes in these countries sought to tightly control the activities of national conferences, not always with success. In Congo/Brazzaville, Madagascar, and Benin, for example, once the conference got under way, alliances were formed in direct opposition to a common enemy, the incumbent regime.

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V. Toward Democratic Consolidation in Africa?

60. Although many would agree that the Western-derived and applied concept of democracy is more or less accepted throughout the world, in Africa pluralist constitutional democracy has represented a real challenge to autocratic regimes for no more than three or four years after 1989. By the early 1990s most incumbents had learned the art of controlling the process of competitive elections, thereby receiving the grudging approval from Western donors without, however, giving up national power. In other words, while African autocrats submitted to democratic elections they did not succumb to them.

61. In the wake of initial exhilaration over Africa's second independence, the consequences of political change have proven as ambiguous as the results of the economic reform that preceded them. Challenges to the old regime have produced an array of outcomes ranging from democratic transition (in Benin and Mali) to political deadlock (in Togo, Kenya, Tunisia, and Egypt), civil catastrophe (in Rwanda, Burundi, and Algeria) state collapse (in Somalia and Liberia), and uncertain regime transformation (in Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Astute political leaders of authoritarian persuasion have quickly adapted to the new "democratic" rules of the game by manipulating constitutional arrangements, interfering with electoral systems, and generally exploiting democratic procedures to achieve authoritarian outcomes in which power has remained concentrated in the hands of a single leader or small group of individuals usually located within the "military-patrimonial complex."

62. Algeria's military leadership is a prototype of this phenomenon. After having usurped political power through a military coup d'état on the eve of about-to-be-completed first-ever multiparty democratic national elections in 1992, the army imposed one of its own to serve as civilian president. This was followed by an array of seriously flawed and compromised elections that installed an unrepresentative president, legislature, and municipal councils. While Algerian citizens themselves were not fooled by this exercise in pseudo- democracy, the regime proclaimed to the world that its efforts were "democratic" and its legitimacy "established"--all this in the face of an unending bloody civil war which erupted following the 1992 coup.

63. Zambia provides another telling example. In 1996, as the first elections following the return to multipartyism were about to take place, the regime of Frederick Chiluba reformed the constitution to head off a possible serious challenge from former President Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party. Among other things, the revised constitution forbade any individual whose parents were not born in Zambia from running for the presidency. Kaunda's parents were alleged to have been born in Malawi. Whereas external pressures five years earlier had been effective in bolstering civil society against the Kaunda regime, in 1996 civil society was in disarray and external pressures on Chiluba proved to be ineffective. Further evidence of Chiluba's propensity to manipulate political institutions in favor of his party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, could be seen in how he exploited electoral rules, parliamentary procedures, and government bureaucrats to frustrate and intimidate his opponents. Kaunda called for a boycott of the elections, but in the end Chiluba was able to win election without serious challenge.

64. In other places such as Gabon and Kenya, autocrats have attempted to ward off proponents of democracy and good governance by institutional manipulation, fraud, and intimidation. They allowed for multi-party elections, but this amounted to electoral democracy rather than to liberal democracy. Despite allowing for a referendum in 1995 that was supposed to drastically curb his executive power, Gabon's Omar Bongo continued to manipulate institutions at his disposal to circumvent the full implementation of new checks on his power. In Kenya, although President Moi succumbed to pressures from civil society to revise the constitution to make it more democratic, the reforms that were instituted were not enough to result in the demise of his autocratic regime. Moi was able to survive intense pressure from international financial institutions and other external actors and, in December 1997, was elected to a final five-year term.

65. It is important to note that even in places where newly elected regimes have reneged on democracy and are drifting toward autocracy or where old autocratic regimes have yielded to procedural democracy while maintaining hegemonic control over politics, it is fair to expect that some democratic gains are, nevertheless, being made. Take Zambia for example. Even as the Chiluba regime was in 1996 attempting to structure politics to ensure his party's victory, the regime was promulgating a law creating a permanent human rights commission. At the same time, however, a rubber-stamp parliament was considering a media bill that would require that a commission, headed by a High Court judge, license journalists. To be sure, the media in Africa is in need of effective codes of conduct, but this was not what motivated Chiluba. The government, obviously feeling threatened by an increasingly free and critical independent print media, was seeking ways of controlling that segment of the opposition. This could be seen in the fact that the bill stipulated that journalists had to have at least a bachelor's (B.A.) degree in journalism or mass communications before they could practice. Public objections to the bill led to its suspension in April 1997.

66. In places such as Algeria, Burundi, Gambia, Niger, and Sierra Leone, military coups have reversed democratic breakthroughs. In Congo/Brazzaville, for example, the former autocratic leader, Denis Sassou- Nguesso, with his personal militia and the aid of Angola's army, was able to topple the democratically elected regime of Pascal Lissouba in 1997. Yet, compared with an earlier generation of military autocrats, military coups have become almost rare in Africa. In fact, African leaders for the most part are strongly and publicly opposed to the intervention of soldiers in politics. For example, shortly after the coup in Sierra Leone in the summer of 1997, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, speaking at the 1997 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit, stated:

Africa can no longer accept the seizure of power by the gun... Where democracy has been usurped, let us do all in our power to restore it to the people. Neighboring states, regional groups and international organizations must all play their parts to restore Sierra Leone's constitutional democratic government.³²

This sentiment was echoed by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe when he asserted:

Coup plotters and those who overthrow democratic governments will find it more difficult to get recognition from us. Democracy is getting stronger in Africa and we now have a definite attitude against coups.³³

67. Currently, almost half the countries of Africa are characterized by at least procedural democracy. But the question regarding the depth and durability of these changes remains. Some students of democracy have consistently argued that the critical test for democratic consolidation are the national elections immediately following the return to multi-party democracy. According to this view, success is proclaimed when the democratically elected government is turned out of office, and the deposed leader graciously accepts the results. Such peaceful turnovers are said to demonstrate a commitment to democracy on the part of both political leaders and the electorate. Recent elections in Benin and Madagascar seem to represent good examples of this. In Benin, a chastened former dictator (Kerekou) in 1995 was able to be re-elected in elections that were essentially free and fair. In 1996 the same was true in Madagascar where former dictator Didier Ratsiraka was able to win re-election in a multi-party election. Ratsiraka frankly admitted, "My victory is due more to the disillusionment of the Malagasy people toward the old regime than to their enthusiasm for me."³⁴ All parties concerned accepted the results of Madagascar's "second elections," and there has been clear evidence that democratic attitudes are beginning to take hold among elites as well as among the public.

68. Some "second elections" that do not result in the turnover of the incumbent regime can still manifest tendencies toward democratic consolidation. Such was the case in Ghana's 1996 presidential elections. In his first term since the re-introduction of multi-party politics, President Jerry Rawlings continued to lead his country's economic recovery, thereby being able to rely on both strong international and domestic support. In the 1996 elections, Rawlings was able to score a huge victory, winning 58 percent of the vote with a 75 percent voter turnout. He clearly demonstrated that he had forsaken the autocratic ways that had characterized his rule before to 1992. The elections ran smoothly and were deemed as free and fair by both local and international observers. Despite the return of Rawlings to power, the opposition demonstrated support for the democratic rules of the game by accepting the verdict of the electorate. However, the real test for Ghana's fledgling democracy will come at the end of Rawlings's second term, after which he is forbidden by law from standing again.

A Case Study: Mali: Democratic Reversal or Consolidation?

69. The difficulties of transition to and consolidation of democracy can be illustrated by the case of Mali. The country's opening to democracy in 1992 following thirty-one years of dictatorship was almost unique at the time, but has since been followed by scores of other countries. More recently, however, the tide of African democracy has subsided as several countries have experienced military coups-- reversal--while others are being governed by incumbents determined to eliminate meaningful competition--adaptation. Mali's current democratic "crisis" is therefore once again raising questions about whether the world's "least-developed continent" is socially or economically ready for Western- style democracy.

70. Mali's political crisis of fall 1997, like those of many of its neighbors, began with deeply flawed legislative elections; in this case, the crisis began with competition for seats in the National Assembly undertaken in April 1997. Accusations of political manipulation resulted in repeat elections in July and August with similar results as the initial round--almost complete domination of the Assembly by the president's party, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali. In earlier presidential elections in May, President Alpha Oumar Konaré won re-election of the presidency virtually unopposed. For the opposition, both moderate (who participated in the disputed elections) and radical (who boycotted the process), "the current situation reflects their expectations for a regime that they contend has, all along, only played at democracy for external consumption. Like governments in many of Mali's undemocratic neighbors, the opposition contends, the Government has angled for near-absolute power at home."³⁵

71. Yet, most independent observers agree that civil society in Mali is being permitted to flourish and that the government is working to establish viable political institutions that involve promoting broad electoral reforms, including campaign funding and spending limits for all parties. The media has a remarkable degree of liberty to criticize the government or to support opposition positions. Significantly, in a country where most people cannot read and write in the official language, this freedom extends to private radio stations as well as newspapers. Even the president himself has repeatedly gone out of his way to state his intention to retire from politics at the end of his second term, refusing the urging of some of those around him to change Mali's constitution to permit a third term.

72. Both Mali's existing public freedoms and presidential willingness to abide by the constitution stand in marked contrast to the situation in the supposedly more developed, prosperous, and institutionalized Tunisia where a virtual one-party dictatorship that forbids all forms of credible political opposition and criticism holds sway. President Ben Ali has made no promise that he will not overturn the constitutional provision limiting the president to two continuous terms. But if facts like these set Mali apart, it is equally true that many of its difficulties stem from realities that have stymied new democracies elsewhere in Africa--from Sierra Leone and Niger, where soldiers have seized power, to Zambia and Chad, where incumbents have rigged elections to ensure comfortable victories.

73. North Africa has been relatively slower to institute even procedural democracy than the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, the region has been characterized by the resistance of incumbent politicians to democratic transformation. For example, Algeria's military-backed government has rigged and blatantly manipulated every presidential, constitutional, legislative, and regional election held since the army high command placed one of its own--Liamine Zeroual--into power in 1994. President Husni Mubarak runs Egypt on a virtual president-for-life basis. Libya's ruling military regime has eliminated all forms of institutional life while the Sudanese army manipulates political Islam to maintain its dictatorial control over a heterogeneous and contentious society.

74. According to many African observers, the above situation is the result of many decades of one- party rule that has bred a "culture of intolerance" and left political skills of coalition building, negotiation, and compromise atrophied. In Mali, as elsewhere across the continent, these traits are manifest as readily among those in opposition as in hardliners in the governing party. Moreover, in many of Africa's extremely poor countries, but evident equally in better off countries as well, the state and its resources are the only economic game in town, and politics in the recent democratic era has often quickly devolved into a deadly winner-take-all struggle for the spoils. For many African observers, the most serious liability of this new struggle over access to the resources of the state is that in countries in which development needs remain at staggering levels, political debate is almost always about power and rarely about policy. As one respected Malian sociologist has observed, "Elections and alternance are obviously important. But we have spent five years without asking essential questions about our development. Elections are being reduced to a fratricidal struggle between self-interested politicians."³⁶

75. Other African leaders, with an obvious self-interest, argue that the continent is simply not yet ready for Western-style electoral systems. President Museveni of Uganda, for example, has instituted a "no-party" voting system. The result is a system run in a strong authoritarian manner but one which has enjoyed relative stability and fast economic growth and, consequently, has received strong backing from Washington and international financial institutions. Uganda has thus been made a model for many of its East African neighbors. Secretary of State Albright's December 1997 seven-country visit to Africa was testimony to this policy of embracing regimes largely for security and economic reasons, not democratic or human rights reasons.

76. Not all share this view. President Konaré of Mali has rejected this no-party model believing, instead, in political pluralism and democratic alternation. These contrasting interpretations of democracy will most likely dominate the African political landscape in the first part of the 21st century as leaders in one-party states pursue pro-market economic policies that produce credible growth rates, which find support from international agencies while using putatively democratic institutions to justify their adaptive authoritarianism. Representative examples of this pattern can be found with Presdients Museveni in Uganda, Ben Ali in Tunisia, Nujoma in Namibia, Mubarak in Egypt, Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Zeroual in Algeria, and Moi in Kenya, among others.

77. There is general agreement among scholars and statesmen alike that the processes of economic and political liberalization in Africa must be analyzed and understood in the context of a broader dynamic of global transformation. While substantive changes have taken place, many of these transitions have proved illusory, creating pseudo-democracies or democracies by default. The global dimension remains pronounced but unpredictable in Africa. The international financial institutions, for example, dominate economic policy and resource mobilization on the continent yet are ill-equipped "to play political midwife, while the diplomatic services of western industrialized countries are seldom able to counter the strategies of incumbent regimes to adopt variations of the 'Chinese model,' market reforms accompanied by limited or deferred political liberalization."³⁷

78. The most likely outcome in the short-term is somewhat similar to a halfway house: a minority of states will continue to liberalize and democratize while other states will revert to repressive autocracies. One thing is clear, however, and that is that as "the novelty of multiparty elections diminishes...and the new authoritarianism in a liberal guise is widely recognized, analysis and advocacy based on a broader conception of democracy [in Africa] are likely to follow."³⁸

79. In conclusion, despite some false steps and setbacks, democratization, if not democracy, seems to be re-establishing roots in many parts of Africa. It is too soon to talk about the consolidation of sustainable democracy in most places. In fact, in most places, one can only speak of fragments of democracy. However, if there is the political will among contending political elites to maintain a democratic course, over time fragmentary gains will tend to accumulate, enhancing the possibilities that democratic culture and habits will become common place. To be sure, there are places where one can speak only of procedural democracy but what is significant is that in recent years the forces of democracy have undermined the autocratic projects of some African regimes. Yet, for most places on the continent, democratic consolidation is likely to be slow, halting, and uneven--in the short term at least.

80. Despite slow, halting, and irregular progress toward democratic consolidation in Africa, it seems reasonable to assume that the overall trend will move in the positive direction. These gains can be greatly enhanced with the continued support of outside supporters of democracy such as the United States.

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VI. United States Support for African Democratization

81. While popular forces in Africa must be given credit for "pushing the democratic envelope" in their respective countries, external actors have also tried to have an impact on this process. This external support has come mainly from multilateral aid agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the European Union (EU), and donor countries such as Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. The multilateral aid agencies claim only to be interested in good governance in Africa, but the same enabling environment that facilitates good governance is also favorable to democratization. Good governance exists when political regimes become accountable, responsible, transparent, and respectful of the rule of law. Bilateral donors in particular have emphasized both the need for good governance and political liberalization.

U.S. Support for Democracy and Human Rights in Africa

82. The United States began a systematic attempt to influence democracy and governance in Africa in the early 1990s. Initially this was done through existing programs in the United States Information Service (USIS), and new programs created in United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The USIS programs were mainly geared toward promoting civic education, empowering disadvantaged groups such as organizations representing the interests of women and children, building democratic institutions, and promoting human rights. USAID's new programs had the same objectives, but were much more focused and extensive.

83. Although fostering democracy and free-market economics has long been the concern of USAID, it historically limited its activities to social and economic development. However, in 1990 USAID established internal working groups on democracy and governance. This was a period in which dramatic political changes were unfolding throughout the non-Western world. In Africa, as mentioned above, autocratic regimes were being pressured by multilateral and bilateral aid organizations to reform both their economies and their political systems as a condition for further economic assistance. Likewise, with the ending of the Cold War, the superpowers decided to cooperate rather than compete for clients in the developing world. It was in this transformed political-economic environment that long-suppressed democratic forces on the continent began to assert themselves.

84. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created in 1983 to promote democracy throughout the world. Among its assigned functions is to provide the needed financial resources to organizations like the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) to enable them to initiate projects, in Africa and elsewhere, that facilitate the establishment of democratic institutions in regions previously characterized by autocratic regimes.

85. It was not until 1990, however, that USAID began to factor democracy and governance into its strategic thinking. The root cause of Africa's economic and social ills was now being linked to poor governance and bad policy choices made by African leaders. Improved governmental efficiency, accountability, and transparency offered the possibility of reversing this trend, but only if these were accompanied by political liberalization leading to broader popular participation in democratic politics. Good governance, or effective public management, then, was seen to provide the enabling condition for political liberalization. This assumption continues to be a cornerstone of U.S. policies in Africa as they relate to democracy and human rights. In a recent speech, U. S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, stated:

Recent history has taught us that economic reforms go hand-in-hand with democracy. An individual's entrepreneurial spirit is unleashed when he or she enjoys political freedom as well as economic incentives to produce. When our human rights and the fruits of our labor are protected by the rule of law, we have greater confidence in the future.³⁹

86. The first Clinton administration (1992-96) attempted to maintain and even expand some of the democracy and human rights programs initiated during the Bush administration. In the field, for example, the United States has encouraged the creation of in-house democracy and governance teams at each mission such as the Democracy and Human Rights Fund (HRF). The HRF permits diplomatic posts to issue small grants to such civil society groups as citizen electoral monitoring groups (e.g. Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Cameroon); civic education projects (e. g., Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, and Malawi); human rights watchdog groups (e.g., Eritrea, Kenya, and Guinea); legal aid organizations (e.g., Uganda, Kenya, and Zimbabwe); women's organizations (e.g., Zambia, Rwanda, and Kenya); and others. The advantage of the mission-based, small HRF is that it provides administrators with the flexibility of responding to the immediate needs of civil society groups that are actively involved in projects promoting democracy and human rights. The HRF grants usually amount only to a few thousand dollars, and never more than $25,000.

87. The Global Center for Democracy and Governance (GCDG) within USAID was given the responsibility for the implementation of Democracy and Governance (D/G) projects in 1993. This office served as a service center to field missions, regional D/G offices, and the Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination. New D/G officers, often academics on leave from their universities, implemented strategic plans in the field and became the conduits through which projects were monitored and new projects identified for possible funding. The idea was not to have regional bureaus working in isolation, seldom sharing ideas and approaches to problem solving, but to have them in regular consultation with headquarters thus allowing for more rational planning and implementation.

88. At the field level, mission-based or regional D/G offices worked through both local and international NGOs that were attempting to promote democracy and human rights. A few examples of these were local and regional umbrella civil society organizations such as the National Committee of Election Observers (CNOE) in Madagascar, the National Organization for Civic Education and Elections Monitoring (NOCEM) in Uganda, the Institute for Education in Democracy in Kenya, and the Study and Research Group on Democratic, Economic and Social Development in Africa (GERDDES) throughout Francophone West and Central Africa. In some cases, American consulting firms such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) were hired to train political parties, local civil society organizations, legislators, jurists, and journalists on the methods and procedures of electoral politics in a democracy. Also, for almost five years (1993-96), many of the policies of USAID were implemented through U.S.-based NGOs that were partners in the African Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF). This body comprised the African-American Institute (AAI), the NDI, and the IRI. On occasion, grants were also made to the Carter Center at Emory University in Atlanta.

89. The rationale for USAID working through NGOs was spelled out in its publication, Strategies for Sustainable Development, which states:

In implementing programs, USAID will work closely with PVOs [private volunteer organizations] and NGOs and private organizations that are committed to supporting democratic development and that have experience working in this field. Their ties to indigenous countries and their international credibility make these organizations valuable partners in building democracy. USAID recognizes that the effectiveness of these organizations depends in large measure on their institutional autonomy [emphasis added].⁴⁰

90. When AREAF was first created it was assumed that its partners, unencumbered by strict bureaucratic oversight from USAID, could work creatively to promote democracy and good governance in Africa. It was expected that AREAF could initiate electoral assistance activities in up to forty countries over a four-year period. At the time it seemed that democracy was being thought of in official circles as nothing more than elections and multi-party politics. The democratization process was assumed by USAID to consist of three stages: 1) Pre-transition--the pre-electoral phase in which a needs assessment would be conducted by AREAF partners; 2) transition--the electoral phase involving the campaign and actual multi-party election; and 3) consolidation--the post-election phase in which AREAF would provide assistance to broaden and deepen democratic institutions and the capacity of indigenous democrats.

91. Early AREAF projects concentrated on 1) rapidly responding to requests for a U.S. presence in countries about to have pluralist national elections or, as in the case of Eritrea, a referendum on independence; 2) providing pre-election assistance to indigenous NGOs in civic education, monitoring, and the empowerment of women and youth; and 3) the development of both local and international capacity to determine whether particular national elections had the possibility of being free and fair.

92. USAID guidelines to AREAF included four primary requirements for the projects they supported: 1) Ensuring African input in the design, implementation, and evaluation of relevant project activities; 2) facilitating transferability of successful strategies from one country to another; 3) targeting women as beneficiaries of AREAF activities; and 4) applying existing rapid-response mechanisms.

93. By the mid-point of its four year mandate, AREAF had worked in 26 different countries and executed more than fifty separate activities. Also, it sponsored ten sub-regional projects. Activities included 1) pre-election technical assessments; 2) direct assistance to the election process, including training and technical support for a wide range of actors including political parties, local and regional NGOs, election commissions, and provision of logistical and material support to election administrators (e.g., ballots, ballot boxes, transport vehicles, indelible ink, etc.); 3) international election observer teams and parallel vote tabulation technology to assess election processes and their outcomes; and 4) limited post-election activities such as technical support for civic organizations, training newly elected parliamentarians in legislative skills, and encouraging the formation of regional NGO networks to encourage "cross fertilization" in electoral processes.

94. By 1996 it was clear that USAID and the U.S. Department of State were in the throes of turf wars over the vigor with which the "democracy envelope" was being pushed. The State Department was not happy with the fact that autonomous NGOs, often represented in the field by young and idealistic representatives, might through their activities unwittingly compromise official U.S. government policy or run afoul of national governments in countries where they were working. In addition, it seemed that USAID, through the GCGD, was bent on centralizing D/G activities. Oftentimes AREAF partners, recognizing that democracy is more than just elections, pushed vigorously to build a culture of democracy in countries in which they worked and found themselves at odds with the State Department as well as the government of the country. For example, the IRI attempted to work with political parties on electoral campaign techniques in Uganda even though the government there prohibits political parties from campaigning. In Ethiopia, an AAI-headed international observer delegation was questioned about its impending report of irregularities in local and regional elections in 1992.

95. In a number of cases, AREAF had been able to introduce or enhance such innovations as local poll watching capacity, civic education programs, and the parallel vote counting (PVT) methodology. For example, local poll watchers had never been employed in elections in Kenya, Uganda, Madagascar, Eritrea, Ghana, and Guinea until AREAF developed local capacity in those countries. PVT was introduced by AREAF in Uganda, where it was well received by the indigenous NGO partner. Although the Ugandan government refused to allow the release of the results of the PVT, local NGOs were able to acquire the methodology, and expressed confidence that they would be allowed to implement the procedure in future elections. Despite a number of successes, by 1995 the AREAF was phased out. D/G functions in the field were subsequently contracted out to NGOs and to for-profit firms on a case-by- case basis.

96. The U.S. government's current approach to D/G focuses less on electoral monitoring and insistence on immediate multi-party electoral competition. Instead, the United States government now emphasizes building institutional capacity and creating enabling environments for the development of a "culture of democracy." Consequently, the immediate pressure for democracy from the United States has been somewhat reduced in Africa. Some of the current projects involve attempting to aid African countries develop independent judiciaries (e.g., Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Rwanda, and Zambia); independent legislatures (e.g., Central African Republic, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Ghana); independent electoral commissions (e.g., Uganda, Eritrea, Togo, Senegal, and Madagascar); empowered women's organizations (e.g., Kenya, and Uganda); training for women legislators (e.g., Uganda, and Zimbabwe); and the development of an independent and responsible media (e.g., Malawi).

97. Regarding the U.S.'s current human rights policy, it must be said that the Clinton administration has recently been particularly conspicuous in its tolerance of grave human rights violations in some states, while being critical of human rights practices of some other states. Although it has devoted relatively high-level attention--with the December 1997 trip to Africa of Secretary of State Albright and the trip by Clinton himself in Spring 1998--the emphasis of the new Africa policy is not on democracy and human rights but rather on trade and security. Despite public pronouncements to the contrary, by its actions or lack thereof, the Administration seems unwilling to make democracy, human rights, and rule of law a central part of its Africa policy. Administration officials claim that U.S. policy cannot be held hostage to human rights, and that it "cannot apply a cookie cutter approach" to these issues. Administration officials continue to cling to a policy of engagement, relying on quiet diplomacy to raise democracy and human rights issues. For example, in dealing with such countries as Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Rwanda, the Administration has turned a blind eye to major restrictions on political rights while building a special relationship with those countries. By contrast, it has adopted a fairly critical stance towards such countries as Kenya, Zambia, and Nigeria.

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VII. Conclusion

98. The causes of African democracy and human rights are now at a critical juncture. At the very moment when the international community should be stepping up its support for democratic forces in Africa, providing the necessary moral, political, and economic impetus for fundamental change, there is a danger that donor fatigue and changing world priorities may lead to a lessening of support. It is critical that constituency groups such as the National Summit on Africa not allow this to happen, and, in fact, do all that is necessary to place African democracy and human rights at the head of the African agenda for the United States. The key to making progress in these areas for African countries is for their leaders to demonstrate their credibility and political will in their commitment to the most fundamental principles of democracy and human rights. The U.S. government should be vigorous in its insistence that African leaders make and stick by such commitments.

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VIII. Suggested Policy Recommendations

(Please note that these recommendations are designed to serve as guidelines and to provide a starting point for regional summit participants in the formulation of their own recommendations for their regional plan of action for U.S.-Africa relations. In crafting their regional plan of action, participants can therefore adopt, amend, discard, or add to these recommendations).

1. Through diplomacy and public pronouncements, the United States should vigorously encourage African leaders to make credible commitments to respect and promote democratic pluralism, good governance, the rule of law and social justice.

2. The U.S. government should make the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights central to its policy. To this end, U.S. foreign assistance programs, trade benefits, and security assistance should be contingent upon respect for human rights, and democratic freedom should be carefully monitored over time on the basis of clear and firm benchmarks.

3. U.S. assistance to democratic forces in Africa should be aimed at creating enabling environments for the strengthening of civil society; ensuring gender equity and the consistent observance of equal citizenship rights; aiding in the establishment of an independent judiciary; governance according to the rule of law; and the elimination of corruption.

4. The U.S. government should increase the monetary and political support directed toward the creation of democratic institutions and the protection of human rights.

5. Financial and logistical support by the United States for regional peacekeeping should incorporate human rights training. The U.S. should closely monitor respect for human rights by recipients of U.S. military assistance.

6. The U.S. government should greatly expand the dialogue with American constituencies for Africa, and implement policies based upon their best judgments.

7. The U.S. should help to foster intra-African democratically based dialogue among political leaders, opinion makers, and representatives of civil society.

8. There should be formed an alliance of constituencies for Africa, with national, regional, and local representation, to encourage the U.S. government to consistently pursue a pro-active and fair Africa policy and to ensure that Africa is made a permanent centerpiece in the U.S.'s foreign policy agenda.